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Many localities are facing unprecedented challenges—such as a 
dramatic rise in homelessness and insufficient transportation 
infrastructure—that have reached crisis levels. These localities are in 
a precarious position. If they do not solve these problems quickly, or if 
they impose overbearing and poorly designed taxes, there will be dire 
economic and social repercussions. 
In response to these challenges, several localities recently enacted 
or proposed taxes targeted directly at large businesses, with revenues 
allocated explicitly for a designated purpose. Localities are gravitating 
toward targeted taxes for several reasons. Some assert that the success 
of large employers within the locality contributed to, or even directly 
created, these challenges. Perhaps most importantly, targeted tax laws 
serve a clear expressive function. Depending on the locality’s primary 
objective, targeted taxes may be problematic and counterproductive. 
This Article begins by examining the recent local targeted tax 
provisions, which have crucial distinctions in motivations and 
mechanics. The Article then undertakes a tax policy and constitutional 
analysis of these targeted taxes and considers whether they are 
properly characterized as a tax or a fee. The Article concludes with 
several proposed alternatives that will generate the requisite revenue, 
and may serve an expressive function, more effectively than targeted 
taxes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
any localities are facing unprecedented challenges, such as a 
dramatic rise in homelessness and insufficient transportation 
infrastructure. In response, several localities recently enacted or 
proposed taxes targeted directly at large businesses, with revenues 
designated for a specific purpose. Depending on the locality’s primary 
objective, targeted taxes may be problematic and counterproductive.  
Targeted taxes are potentially problematic for several reasons, 
including the very limited and specific targeted taxpayers, the activity 
being taxed, and the mechanics of the taxes themselves. Many of these 
taxes are a flat amount per employee located within the locality. 
Imposing a direct tax on job creation within a locality will 
disincentivize creating jobs within that locality—generally an 
undesirable result.  
So why are localities suddenly gravitating toward targeted taxes? 
First, challenges such as rampant homelessness and overwhelmed 
transportation infrastructure have reached crisis levels for many 
localities. Some assert that the success of large employers within the 
locality contributed to, or even directly created, these challenges. 
Second, localities face significant constraints as to the methods they 
can use to raise revenue. Third, and perhaps most importantly, targeted 
tax laws serve a clear expressive function.  
The stakes are quite high for localities. Tax migration is a very real 
concern at the local level, particularly with localities competing to lure 
tech companies’ expansion efforts. Many of these localities rely on just 
one large employer to support their existing tax bases. If that employer 
migrates out of the locality—either in whole or in part—the locality 
jeopardizes not only the new targeted tax revenue but also its existing 
property tax, sales tax, business tax, and personal income tax revenues. 
If a locality’s primary aim is virtue signaling, then an overwhelming 
barrage of targeted taxes, like San Francisco’s recent approach, 
accomplishes that objective effectively. But if a locality’s primary aims 
are to disincentivize the root cause of the problem, and generate 
additional revenue to mitigate that problem, there are several better 
alternatives to targeted taxes. 
This Article begins in Part I by examining the recent local targeted 
tax provisions, which have crucial distinctions in motivations and 
mechanics. Part II undertakes a tax policy and constitutional analysis 
M 
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of these targeted taxes and considers whether they are properly 
characterized as a tax or a fee. Part III concludes with alternatives that 
may accomplish the localities’ goals without the drawbacks of these 
targeted tax provisions.  
I 
TARGETED TAX LANDSCAPE 
Most localities that have considered targeted taxes thus far are tech-
heavy cities on the West Coast of the United States.1 Seattle kindled 
the trend with what was essentially a per-employee tax proposal with 
revenues earmarked to combat escalating homelessness in the city. 
Although Seattle subsequently repealed its tax, several California cities 
embraced the concept.  
San Francisco has now spearheaded the targeted tax movement. Like 
Seattle, San Francisco enacted a targeted tax to combat homelessness. 
San Francisco structured its tax as an additional gross receipts tax 
instead of a per-employee tax. San Francisco also proposed several new 
or increased targeted taxes, including a commercial rents tax with 
revenues earmarked for childcare and early education; an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) tax with revenues earmarked for income inequality 
mitigation programs; and an excessive CEO compensation tax with 
revenues earmarked for mental health programs.  
Localities on both coasts have advanced targeted taxes to fund 
transportation infrastructure development. In California, Cupertino 
proposed, and Mountain View voters enacted, per-employee taxes to 
fund transportation. Localities on the East Coast have flirted with 
targeted taxes to fund transportation infrastructure, but the proposed 
1 The targeted tax movement is most prevalent at the U.S. local level, but it has started 
to reach the international stage. France was the first country to enact a targeted tax as to 
imposition, aimed at large U.S.-based tech companies. France imposes a 3% tax on gross 
“digital” revenue if a business has digital revenue of at least €750 million worldwide and 
€25 million in France. The tax will impact approximately thirty businesses, and the U.S. 
government has asserted that the new digital tax discriminates impermissibly. Isabel 
Gottlieb, Big Tech Takes Fight over French Digital Tax to EU, BLOOMBERG L. (July 25, 
2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XFU0HKR4000000?bna_ 
news_filter=daily-tax-report-international&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016c299cddf2afee 
299dd6810001#jcite [https://perma.cc/FTT2-9679]; Bertrand Hermant, INSIGHT: France 
Taxes the Digital Economy, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 8, 2019, 12:00 AM), https://www. 
bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/X9A8NJ4G000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-
report-international&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016c43e0da9aad6f63e61f2d0001#jcite 
[https://perma.cc/P9ND-MBF3]. Unlike U.S. local targeted taxes, France’s digital tax does 
not have a specific spending designation. Id.  
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target of the tax tends to be “millionaire” individuals rather than large 
employers.  
The most innovative targeted tax approach belongs to Portland, 
Oregon. Portland is the first locality generating tax revenue to address 
climate change. Portland enacted a targeted retail gross receipts tax 
with revenues earmarked for clean energy projects. Portland is also the 
first locality to enact an excessive CEO compensation tax.  
Because these taxes have important distinctions—and 
motivations—it is instructive to analyze each in detail. The structure of 
each tax, and the locality’s justifications, are critical to avoid 
constitutional infirmities and to develop more efficient and effective 
solutions to each locality’s pressing challenges. 
A. Seattle Homelessness Tax
Seattle’s homelessness tax garnered significant national attention 
due to its novelty and the fervent corporate backlash it produced. 
Seattle enacted the tax on May 16, 2018, but repealed it just a month 
later.2  
Although there were many iterations of the proposed homelessness 
tax, Seattle enacted an “employee hours tax” that essentially functioned 
as a per-employee tax.3 The provision included two options for 
businesses subject to the tax: (1) pay a tax that totaled $275 annually 
for each full-time employee working in Seattle, or (2) pay tax at a rate 
of $0.14323 per hour worked by each employee in Seattle.4 
Importantly, the tax applied only to large businesses operating in 
Seattle. Seattle imposed the tax on businesses that generated greater 
than $20 million of taxable gross income in Seattle.5 The city estimated 
that only 3% of Seattle business taxpayers would be subject to the new 
2 Council B. 119250 (Seattle, Wash. 2018) (enacting Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125578 
(May 16, 2018)) (codified as SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.37, 5.38 (2018)); 
Council B. 119280 (Seattle, Wash. 2018) (enacting Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125592 (June 
13, 2018)) (repealing Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125578 (June 13, 2018)). 
3 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.37 (repealed 2018). 
4 Id. § 030 (repealed). The initial proposed bills imposed tax at an annual rate of $500 
per full-time employee, but that rate was cut almost in half after the Seattle business 
community’s overwhelmingly negative reaction. See Council B. 119250 (enacting 
Ordinance 125578); Matt Mcllwain, Open Letter—Business Leaders Speak Out on the 
Seattle “Head Tax,” MEDIUM (May 8, 2018), https://medium.com/@mattmcilwain/no-on-
seattle-head-tax-846f7a9dd655 [https://perma.cc/6PEJ-S2PY].  
5 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.37, § 050(A)(1), ch. 5.45 (repealed 2018). 
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tax.6 Revenue projections varied, but the final estimate was that the tax 
would generate $47.4 million annually.7 The tax would have been 
effective January 1, 2019, through December 31, 2023.8  
The tax appeared to be aimed primarily at Amazon, which would 
have paid an estimated $12 million annually—over 25% of the total 
annual revenue the tax would have generated.9 Just a handful of large 
businesses based in Seattle, namely Starbucks, Expedia, and Alaska 
Air, would have generated the majority of the tax revenue.10 Seattle 
designed the tax as a per-employee tax, and used gross income instead 
of net income for the application threshold, to ensure that large 
businesses would pay tax even if they were not profitable. Such an 
approach is understandable, particularly with Seattle’s primary target 
being Amazon, which has paid minimal U.S. federal corporate net 
income tax.11 One major flaw with this tax structure, however, is that 
it disproportionally affects low-margin businesses, especially those 
with significant lower-wage employee bases, such as local grocery 
store chains.12  
6 Memorandum from Dan Eder, Cent. Staff Deputy Dir., Seattle City Council, & Erik 
Sund, Budget & Fin. Coordinator, Seattle City Council, to Fin. & Neighborhoods Comm. 
(Apr. 25, 2018), http://seattle.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=6211937&GUID=00E43 
D6F-6488-4FBF-B898-626D12BE0B44 [https://perma.cc/RAC8-RZEU] [hereinafter Dan 
Eder Memorandum]. The 3% of Seattle business taxpayers equates to approximately 585 
businesses. Id.  
7 SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, SUMMARY AND FISCAL NOTE, https://seattle.legistar.com/ 
View.ashx?M=F&ID=6235882&GUID=ED4AEEC8-907E-428A-987E-A3CDEE590C81 
[https://perma.cc/HZE2-WRSV] (discussing Council Bill 119250). 
8 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.37, § 030(G) (repealed 2018). 
9 Economic Implications of Taxing Employment, ECONORTHWEST (last visited Jan. 
20, 2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/597fb96acd39c34098e8d423/t/5c5b0aa34 
1920276d92d528a/1549470382831/Economic+Implications+of+Taxing+Employment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UM45-W46B] [hereinafter ECONORTHWEST]. 
10 See Travis H. Brown, How Seattle’s New Tax to Fight Homelessness Could Ruin Its 
Economy, FORTUNE (May 17, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://fortune.com/2018/05/17/head-tax-
in-seattle-amazon-starbucks/ [https://perma.cc/S8JZ-48LL]. 
11 See Stephanie Denning, Why Amazon Pays No Corporate Taxes, FORBES  
(Feb. 22, 2019, 7:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephaniedenning/2019/02/22/ 
why-amazon-pays-no-corporate-taxes/#2071985654d5 [https://perma.cc/WHF4-ABRD]; 
Danny Westneat, Amazon Puts the Smile in Federal Income Taxes — by Not Paying Any, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019, 7:58 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/ 
politics/amazon-puts-the-smile-in-federal-income-taxes-by-not-paying-any/ 
[https://perma.cc/HNS6-FC2T]. 
12 See Benjamin Romano, Not Just an ‘Amazon Tax’: Other Seattle Businesses Join 
Head-Tax Fight, SEATTLE TIMES (May 8, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
business/wide-range-of-seattle-businesses-speak-out-against-head-tax-proposal/ 
[https://perma.cc/9L9X-BB3P]. 
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All concede that homelessness has reached epidemic levels in 
Seattle.13 Seattle has been in a state of civil emergency related to 
homelessness since 2015.14 Homelessness is estimated to cost the 
Seattle-area economy $1.1 billion due to extra policing, lost tourism 
and business, and frequent homeless hospitalization.15 A McKinsey 
& Company report concluded that King County, Washington, needed 
to spend from $360 million to $410 million annually to effectively 
combat homelessness, which would approximately double the current 
annual expenditure.16 Seated in King County, Seattle’s proportional 
contribution to that additional spending would be $70 million 
annually.17  
The primary cause of Seattle’s homelessness epidemic and how best 
to combat it divides the city and its large businesses. A survey 
concluded that almost one-third of homelessness in King County, 
Washington, is caused by job loss, which was the single largest 
reported cause of homelessness.18 Only 6% reported that not being able 
to afford rent increases was the cause of their homelessness.19 
McKinsey, however, pointed to the correlation between homelessness 
increasing and market rents increasing.20 Others respond that 
homelessness has decreased in many other major cities even as market 
rents have increased.21  
13 See, e.g., Council B. 119250 (Seattle, Wash. 2018) (enacting Seattle, Wash., 
Ordinance 125578 (May 16, 2018)); Mcllwain, supra note 4; Christopher F. Rufo, 
Seattle Under Siege, CITY J. (2018), https://www.city-journal.org/seattle-homelessness 
[https://perma.cc/64JH-MJGC]; Maggie Stringfellow & Dilip Wagle, The Economics of 
Homelessness in Seattle and King County, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (May 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-cities/the-economics-of-
homelessness-in-seattle-and-king-county [https://perma.cc/5KNZ-DE3K]. The Seattle City 
Council also recognized that a solution requires a “collaborative effort.” Council B. 119250 
(enacting Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125578).  
14 Council B. 119250 (enacting Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 125578). 
15 Stringfellow & Wagle, supra note 13.  
16 Id.; Matt Day & Noah Buhayar, Amazon Led a Tax Rebellion. A Year Later, Seattle 
Is Gridlocked, BLOOMBERG L. (June 9, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-06-09/after-amazon-led-tax-rebellion-seattle-s-homeless-aid-stalls 
[https://perma.cc/9ARR-FQZC]. 
17 Memorandum from Michael Maddux, Legislative Aide & Policy Researcher, Seattle 
City Council, to Teresa Mosqueda, Councilmember, Seattle City Council (May 10, 2018), 
https://seattle.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=6247405&GUID=887FA391-72BE-4563-
B1C1-07D96F32EB1B [https://perma.cc/7G4C-LP5F] [hereinafter Mosqueda Memorandum]. 
18 ECONORTHWEST, supra note 9.  
19 Rufo, supra note 13.  
20 Stringfellow & Wagle, supra note 13. 
21 Rufo, supra note 13. 
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As for the Seattle City Council’s motivations for the tax, the bill 
itself contained a four-page explanation. The bill recognized that 
Seattle’s “growth and prosperity has directly contributed to the rapid 
increase in the number of individuals and families experiencing 
homelessness.”22 The bill also recognized a “correlation between 
increasing rent and homelessness.”23 Members of Seattle’s City 
Council traveled to New York City to encourage New York City to 
pass legislation to fund the resultant housing and transportation 
problems that Amazon’s expansion would create there.24 The City 
Council’s belief that economic prosperity and the resultant increased 
housing costs are the primary cause of homelessness in the city explains 
why the City Council would target Seattle’s successful large businesses 
to remedy the problem. 
Even if large businesses were to concede that their success created 
Seattle’s homelessness epidemic, there are fundamental disagreements 
regarding the remedy and who should coordinate it. Substantively, the 
primary debate is whether to focus more on building affordable housing 
or building shelters.25 Administratively, businesses prefer to fund 
programs directly. Amazon and Microsoft are currently building 
homeless shelters in King County.26 Microsoft set aside $500 million 
for affordable housing, including $25 million earmarked specifically 
for homelessness mitigation programs.27 Amazon founder Jeff Bezos 
created the Bezos Day One Fund with a commitment of $2 billion 
to assist homeless families and create preschools in low-income 
communities.28 The fund has already contributed $97.5 million in 
22 Council B. 119250 (Seattle, Wash. 2018) (enacting Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 
125578). 
23 Id. 
24 Krista Gmelich & Spencer Soper, Seattle City Council Members Visit NYC to Warn 
About Amazon HQ2, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 7, 2019, 8:47 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw. 
com/product/tax/document/XA49T6EC000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report&jcsearch= 
BNA%2520000001682922d327a7fcfdff92d70000#jcite [https://perma.cc/K3WM-XP6Z]. 
25 See Mosqueda Memorandum, supra note 17; Brown, supra note 10; Michael Hiltzik, 
Column: Mountain View’s Proposed ‘Google Tax’ Reminds Us That Big Employers Bring 
Not Just Jobs, But Problems, L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://www. 
latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-google-tax-20180510-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS9V-
UEUB]; Rufo, supra note 13; Stringfellow & Wagle, supra note 13. 
26 Day & Buhayar, supra note 16. 
27 Id.  
28 BEZOS DAY ONE FUND, https://www.bezosdayonefund.org/ [https://perma.cc/E5HA-
ZTJH] (last visited Jan. 17, 2020). 
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grants to organizations combating homelessness nationwide, although 
only a small portion has been directed to the Seattle area.29  
Because of these fundamental disagreements, and the per-employee 
nature of the tax, Seattle businesses opposed the homelessness tax 
vehemently.30 Amazon publicly threatened to abandon a planned 
Seattle expansion project, which could have accommodated 7,000 new 
jobs worth an estimated $3.5 billion in total additional economic 
output.31 But Amazon was not alone. Over 100 CEOs of Seattle-based 
businesses, representing tens of thousands of Seattle jobs, signed a 
letter opposing the tax.32 CEOs opposed the per-employee tax  
because of the message it sends to every business: if you are investing 
in growth, if you create too many jobs in Seattle, you will be 
punished. Sending this message to entrepreneurs, investors, and job 
creators will cause far greater damage to Seattle’s growth prospects 
than the direct impact on the businesses being taxed.33  
The letter suggested that instead of a “head tax,” the better approach 
is “collaboration and dialogue to come up with innovative solutions 
to maintain a thriving economy in [Seattle].”34 The CEOs offered to 
“join forces to make a plan that sustains the growth our city is proud 
of, while also addressing the problems of housing, homelessness and 
infrastructure.”35 The Seattle Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce 
commissioned an economic analysis of the tax that concluded the tax 
would be counterproductive and “may disproportionately impact lower 
wage earners and exacerbate the root causes of homelessness.”36 
29 Rebecca Aydin, Jeff Bezos Donated $100 Million to Fighting Homelessness — and in 
an Unusual Move, He’s Letting the Charities Control How It’s Spent, BUS. INSIDER 
(Aug. 12, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/jeff-bezos-donation-fighting-
homelessness-hands-off-approach-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/QVF2-ZDW7]; Lauren Feiner, 
Jeff Bezos’ Day One Fund Gives $97.5 Million to 24 Groups Helping the Homeless, CNBC 
(Nov. 20, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/20/bezos-day-one-fund-gives-
97point5-million-to-help-the-homeless.html [https://perma.cc/S5AL-TQWV]. Bezos is 
allowing each recipient organization to spend the funds with minimal oversight, requiring 
only an annual report. Aydin, supra.  
30 See, e.g., Alana Semuels, How Amazon Helped Kill a Seattle Tax on Business, 
ATLANTIC (June 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/06/how-
amazon-helped-kill-a-seattle-tax-on-business/562736/ [https://perma.cc/QX6L-85CV]. 
31 ECONORTHWEST, supra note 9.  
32 Mcllwain, supra note 4.  
33 Id. (emphasis added). 
34 Id. (“This is like telling a classroom that the students who do the most homework will 
be singled out for detention.”). 
35 Id. 
36 ECONORTHWEST, supra note 9. 
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Seattle repealed the homelessness tax because there were tens of 
thousands of signatures gathered to repeal the tax via referendum, and 
Seattle wanted to avoid election-related costs to defend the tax 
provision.37  
Further explaining Seattle businesses’ opposition to another tax 
regime are the myriad taxes they face already in Washington. Seattle 
has an existing Business & Occupation tax, and Washington recently 
enacted a host of new state-level business tax measures.38 To expand 
its tax regime, Washington enacted a payroll tax that will generate 
approximately $1 billion annually to fund long-term care,39 increased 
its Business & Occupation tax by approximately $450 million annually 
to fund job training and education,40 increased its Business & 
Occupation tax as applied to financial institutions by an estimated $100 
million annually,41 and enacted a graduated real estate excise tax rate 
for commercial property that will generate $175 million annually.42  
Although the per-employee homelessness targeted tax initiative was 
a failure in Seattle, the city will likely be monitoring San Francisco’s 
efforts to combat homelessness. As discussed below, San Francisco’s 
anticipated approach going forward is one that Seattle can likely adopt 
without as much business opposition.  
37 SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 7. 
38 See Garry G. Fujita, Possible Surprises for Washington Taxpayers After the 2019 
Session, TAX NOTES (July 1, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-state/legislation-
and-lawmaking/possible-surprises-washington-taxpayers-after-2019-session/2019/06/17/29jyw 
[https://perma.cc/YM9X-VG3R]. 
39 H.B. 1087, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); Paul Jones, Washington Governor 
Signs $1 Billion Payroll Tax for Long-Term Care, TAX NOTES (May 15, 2019), https://www. 
taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/legislation-and-lawmaking/washington-governor-signs- 
1-billion-payroll-tax-long-term-care/2019/05/15/29hnf [https://perma.cc/8WMD-T4RS].
40 H.B. 2158, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); James Nani, Wash. Hikes Biz Taxes
to Fund Job Training, Education, LAW360 (May 23, 2019), https://www.law360.com/tax-
authority/articles/1162406/wash-hikes-biz-taxes-to-fund-job-training-education 
[https://perma.cc/D5DP-6JFT]. 
41 H.B. 2167, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); Brett Durbin & Scott Edwards, Wash. 
Companies Should Brace for New Law’s Major Tax Hit, LAW360 (May 7, 2019, 4:57 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1155483/wash-companies-should-brace-for-new-law-s-
major-tax-hit [https://perma.cc/H5JN-34HK]. 
42 S.B. 5998, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); Durbin & Edwards, supra note 41. 
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B. San Francisco Business Taxes
To understand the current state of San Francisco business taxes, one 
must examine recent history.43 In 2011, San Francisco offered tax 
incentives, most notably a payroll tax exclusion aimed at Twitter, to 
encourage tech growth and hiring in the recession’s aftermath.44 In 
2012, San Francisco enacted a gross receipts tax to replace its payroll 
expense tax, which had arguably driven tech companies out of the 
city.45 San Francisco planned to phase out the payroll expense tax.46 
San Francisco had intentionally created a pro-business-taxpayer 
environment that helped accomplish the city’s objective to retain and 
attract growing tech companies.47 San Francisco has added an average 
of 24,000 new jobs annually from 2010 to 2017.48 In 2017, tech 
accounted for 24% of total private wages in San Francisco, up from 7% 
in 2008.49  
When the gross receipts tax did not generate as much revenue as 
anticipated, however, San Francisco retained the payroll expense tax 
that it had planned to phase out.50 Starting in 2018, San Francisco 
enacted and proposed a barrage of targeted taxes, alienating many in 
43 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously remarked in a tax opinion that “a page 
of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921). 
44 See, e.g., Gregory Barber, No More Deals: San Francisco Considers Raising Taxes 
on Tech, WIRED (July 16, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/no-more-deals- 
san-francisco-considers-raising-taxes-tech/ [https://perma.cc/AK2D-4JEF]; Joyce E. Cutler, 
‘Twitter’ Tax Break in San Francisco Ends Amid Push for New Funds, BLOOMBERG L. 
(May 15, 2019, 1:46 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X9L121VO000000? 
bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016aa3f2dbe3a3eeabff 
a8290000#jcite [https://perma.cc/32SG-GNHX] [hereinafter ‘Twitter’ Tax Break]; Katy 
Steinmetz, What the Twitter Tax Break Means for San Francisco, TIME (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://time.com/14335/twitter-tax-break-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/L683-EN5E]. 
45 See Joyce E. Cutler, The Uber Tax? Stock-Based Compensation Faces New Local 
Levy, BLOOMBERG L. (May 9, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
X84HR6I8000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016a99 
c8dbeea57afbc8012e0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/H27N-MUHB] [hereinafter The Uber Tax?]. 
46 See id. 
47 ‘Twitter’ Tax Break, supra note 44. Tenderloin Housing Clinic Executive Director 
Randy Shaw stated, “The tax break brought more investment to the area from 2012-2019 
than in the preceding fifty years combined.” Id. 
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 See The Uber Tax?, supra note 45; Dominic Fracassa, SF Launches Sweeping Review 
of City’s Business Taxes, S.F. CHRON. (July 3, 2019, 9:26 AM), https://www.sfchronicle. 
com/bayarea/article/SF-launches-sweeping-review-of-city-s-business-14068142.php?psid= 
crEI3 [https://perma.cc/RS38-9DRQ] [hereinafter SF Launches Sweeping Review].  
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the San Francisco business community who grew their businesses, and 
invested in the community, based on the understanding that the gross 
receipts tax would be the sole general business tax in the city.51 
1. San Francisco Homelessness Tax
Seattle’s homelessness epidemic is dwarfed only by San
Francisco’s, so it was no surprise when San Francisco emulated 
Seattle’s targeted tax approach.52 San Francisco voters enacted a new 
tax targeted at large businesses within the city with the revenue 
expressly designated to combat homelessness.53 The official bill 
recognized that “San Francisco is experiencing a housing crisis of 
historic proportions that has led to a major humanitarian and public 
health crisis in large-scale homelessness for which the City has 
insufficient resources to address.”54 Importantly, San Francisco’s tax 
differs from Seattle’s in that it generally imposes an additional tax on 
large businesses’ gross receipts rather than on their number of 
employees.55  
San Francisco voters enacted the new homelessness tax in 
November 2018.56 The new provision imposes an additional tax of 
0.175% to 0.69%, depending on business classification, on taxable 
gross receipts totaling over $50 million.57 The tax is estimated to 
generate $250 million to $300 million annually, which will be 
51 SF Launches Sweeping Review, supra note 50. 
52 San Francisco’s homelessness epidemic is jeopardizing its vital tourism industry that 
generates $9 billion a year, employs 80,000 people, and generates more than $725 million 
in local taxes. See, e.g., S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2802(i) (2019); Matier 
& Ross, SF’s Appalling Street Life Repels Residents — Now It’s Driven Away a Convention, 
S.F. CHRON. (July 3, 2018, 7:58 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/matier-ross/ 
article/SF-s-appalling-street-life-repels-residents-13038748.php [https://perma.cc/SG77-
BAXQ].  
53 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28. 
54 Id. § 2802(a). 
55 Many businesses, however, may fall within an alternative tax based on a percentage 
of payroll expense within the city. For these businesses, they will face an aggregate payroll 
tax of 3.28% (consisting of 1.4% administrative office tax, 1.5% homelessness tax, and 
0.38% payroll expense tax). S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2804(d); 
S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, 12-A-1, § 953.8(a); Payroll Expense Tax (PY),
TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR, http://sftreasurer.org/business/taxes-fees/payroll-
expense-tax-py [https://perma.cc/4AUV-XNBV] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
56 S.F., Cal., Ordinance 01317218 (Jan. 1, 2019) (codified as S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX 
REGS. CODE art. 28 (2019)). 
57 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28 § 2804 (2018). 
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deposited in the “Our City, Our Home Fund.”58 Businesses subject to 
the homelessness tax comprise approximately 15% to 20% of the city’s 
job base and pay 40% of the city’s existing business taxes.59 
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors did not officially assert that 
the large businesses in San Francisco caused the homelessness 
problem, but rather that these businesses are best able to bear the costs 
to remedy it.60 The bill also recognized that large businesses were the 
beneficiaries of a significant corporate tax rate cut under the federal 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, and that San Francisco should reap a 
portion of those savings.61  
One City Supervisor, Gordon Mar, blamed large businesses for the 
city’s problems much more directly. Mar said, “A lot of these problems 
have been exacerbated by the tech boom, from affordability and 
gentrification to homelessness and gridlock on our streets.”62 Mar 
elaborated, “We’ve seen growing traffic congestion and gridlock on 
our streets due to the huge influx of new workers here in our city. 
We’ve seen a growing . . . housing affordability crisis . . . our 
homelessness crisis . . . due just to the growing economic divide here 
in our city.”63 Finally, unusual for a local politician, Mar expressly 
supported limiting job growth: “We can’t just keep supporting job 
creation and growth unchecked.”64  
As for the business community reaction, there was a high-profile 
debate between San Francisco-headquartered tech companies, with the 
Salesforce CEO supporting the tax, and the Twitter/Square CEO65 and 
Stripe CEO opposing it.66 Other opponents argued that spending would 
58 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2802(b) (2019); Letter from Ben 
Rosenfield, S.F. City Controller, to John Arntz, S.F. Dep’t of Elections (Aug. 13, 2018) 
[hereinafter Letter from Ben Rosenfield to John Arntz]. 
59 Letter from Ben Rosenfield to John Arntz, supra note 58.  
60 See S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2802(c). 
61 Id.  
62 Barber, supra note 44. 
63 Ailsa Chang, San Francisco Supervisor Talks About Impact of Big Tech, NPR (May 
9, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/09/721828933/san-francisco-supervisor-
talks-about-impact-of-big-tech [https://perma.cc/E7QG-K3FE]. 
64 Id. 
65 Molly Kissler, Jack Dorsey Sees ‘Unfairness’ in San Francisco Homeless Tax, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2018, 9:20 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
10-19/square-s-dorsey-sees-unfairness-in-san-francisco-homeless-tax [https://perma.cc/
5QB9-RA44].
66 Jon Zieger, Vote No on Prop. C — More Spending Without a Plan Won’t Address 
Homelessness, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 25, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
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not actually fix the homelessness problem, given how much San 
Francisco spends already and the lack of progress.67 And others 
asserted that blaming big tech companies for the homelessness crisis in 
San Francisco is counterproductive because it obfuscates the true 
causes and potential solutions.68  
There are several interesting ancillary aspects of San Francisco’s 
targeted homelessness tax. Before implementing and enforcing the tax, 
San Francisco preemptively filed an action to determine its validity.69 
The tax’s overall validity is in question due to supermajority approval 
requirements, which San Francisco’s new targeted taxes failed to 
satisfy—garnering around 60% of voter approval.70 A San Francisco 
County trial court concluded that the supermajority requirement does 
not apply to voter initiatives like the one that created the homelessness 
tax, but a Fresno County trial court subsequently concluded the 
opposite, and these conflicting cases are being appealed.71 Because of 
the lingering question regarding the new tax’s validity, San Francisco 
designed a creative voluntary contribution alternative.72 Businesses 
opinion/openforum/article/Vote-no-on-Prop-C-Taxing-business-to-help-13257616.php 
[https://perma.cc/5HX4-8HB9]. 
67 Id. 
68 Adam Rogers, Big Tech Isn’t the Problem with Homelessness. It’s All of Us, WIRED 
(June 21, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/big-tech-isnt-the-problem-with-
homelessness-its-all-of-us/?verso=true [https://perma.cc/TQ9M-EVYE] (asserting that true 
causes of homelessness include resistance to affordable housing in more affluent 
neighborhoods, drug addiction, and mental health issues; potential solutions include 
“supportive housing,” free and accessible primary medical care, right-to-shelter laws, and 
most importantly, dispersed affordable housing).  
69 Dominic Fracassa, Judge Says SF Correct in Passing Two Tax Measures on Simple 
Majority Vote, S.F. CHRON. (July 5, 2019), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/ 
Judge-says-SF-correct-in-passing-two-tax-measures-14074436.php [https://perma.cc/8VGE 
-7KHN]; Paul Jones, California Judge Says Simple Majority Vote OK for Many Special
Taxes, TAX NOTES (July 10, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/
legislation-and-lawmaking/california-judge-says-simple-majority-vote-ok-many-special-
taxes/2019/07/10/29q1t?highlight=%22California%20Judge%20Says%20Simple%20
Majority%22 [https://perma.cc/7UX5-DN38].
70 Jones, supra note 69. 
71 Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. San Francisco, No. CHC-18-568657 (Cal. App. 
Dep’t Super. Ct. S.F. Cnty. July 5, 2019), on appeal; San Francisco v. Proposition C, No. 
CGC-19-573230 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. S.F. Cnty. July 5, 2019), on appeal; City of 
Fresno v. Fresno Bldg. Healthy Cmtys., No. 19CECG00422 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
Fresno Cnty. Sept. 5, 2019), on appeal. Each trial court interpreted a recent California 
Supreme Court case differently to reach their respective conclusions. See California 
Cannabis Coal. v. Upland, 401 P.3d 49 (Cal. 2017). 
72 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2805.1 (2019); Joyce E. Cutler, San 
Francisco Board OKs Credit for High-Earner Business Tax ‘Gift,’ BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 
16, 2019, 2:12 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-tax-report-state/san-francisco-
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may pay the homelessness tax voluntarily pending the final resolution 
of the legal challenge to the tax.73 Those businesses will receive a 
110% credit toward their homelessness tax liability, but they must 
agree to forgo any potential refund if the tax is struck down.74 San 
Francisco also enacted a similar tax credit provision that allows gifts to 
the “Our City, Our Home Fund.”75 However, the tax credit provision 
for gifts to the fund expires either when the legal challenge is resolved 
or 2024, whichever is earlier.76  
2. San Francisco IPO Tax Proposal
In response to Uber’s initial public offering in May 2019, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors proposed an “IPO tax” that would 
target publicly traded San Francisco-based tech companies.77 San 
Francisco would impose a substantial tax on stock-based 
compensation, and the tax would be retroactive to capture the Uber 
IPO.78 The proposal would increase taxes on stock-based 
compensation within San Francisco to 1.5% from the current general 
payroll tax rate of 0.38%.79 The tax revenue would be dedicated to a 
“shared prosperity fund,” which would support affordable housing and 
other low-to-moderate-income support programs.80 
The stated purpose of the IPO tax was to “tax the wealth generated 
by IPOs to fund programs to address income inequality.”81 City 
Supervisor Mar stated, “We know corporate IPOs alone did not cause 
gives-credit-for-paying-homeless-tax?context=search&index=0 [https://perma.cc/UBR4-
L3QW] [hereinafter San Francisco Board OKs]. 
73 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, § 2805.1; San Francisco Board OKs, 
supra note 72. 
74 City of S.F., Ordinance 73-19 (amending S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28) 
(effective May 1, 2019), https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=7144785&GUID 
=A93FEB87-740D-4777-8D83-8C96FCD61B3C [https://perma.cc/6C7E-ZWSC]. 
75 Id. § 2805.2. 
76 Id. § 2805.1. 
77 The Uber Tax?, supra note 45.  
78 Id. 
79 Romy Varghese, San Francisco IPO Tax Won’t Be on November’s Ballot After 
All, BLOOMBERG L. (July 17, 2019, 5:27 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/ 
tax/document/XAT07AJ0000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report&jcsearch=BNA% 
25200000016c0271d36aadef4377b55d0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/D5LD-NDJ4]. 
80 The Uber Tax?, supra note 45. 
81 Josh Eidelson, Uber Faces Proposed ‘IPO Tax’ in a Divided San Francisco, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:41 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
XAGQG24000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%252000000 
16a4f2adcdea1feef7b51020000#jcite [https://perma.cc/7378-PCNA]. 
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income inequality and our social crises, . . . [b]ut they have, and will, 
exacerbate it.”82 While Supervisor Sandra Lee Fewer more directly 
declared, “San Francisco can no longer afford to give these 
corporations a tax cut.”83  
As discussed above, San Francisco repealed a similar tax in 2012 in 
response to large businesses migrating out of the city, and instead 
created a gross receipts tax.84 In response to the IPO tax proposal, the 
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce asserted,  
Fifteen years ago companies were leaving San Francisco because 
they were told to pay a 1.5% payroll tax on stock options. If you want 
to drive San Francisco companies out of the city when they go public, 
you only have to look at the history of stock-based payroll tax to see 
that it’s an ineffective solution.85  
Although San Francisco initially planned to present the IPO tax as a 
special tax during the November 2019 election, the city postponed the 
measure until 2020 and plans to design the tax as a general tax instead, 
or to incorporate it into a gross receipts tax revamp.86 
3. Additional San Francisco Proposed and Enacted Taxes
Another reason San Francisco tabled the IPO tax proposal was to
focus on a new ride-share tax proposal.87 San Francisco, with support 
from Uber and Lyft, will place a ride-share tax proposal on the ballot 
in November 2019, with revenues dedicated to transit improvements.88 
82 In a more robust statement, Mar said, 
San Francisco has the highest housing costs in the country, the largest income gap 
in the country, and the most billionaires per-capita anywhere in the world. The 
record number of upcoming IPOs will exacerbate each of these forms of 
inequality—so we’re taking action to end tax breaks for big tech to invest in small 
businesses; mental health services; affordable housing; vulnerable youth, families, 
seniors; and low and moderate income workers across this City.  
Supervisor Gordon Mar – Newsletter, S.F. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS (July 18, 2019), 
https://sfbos.org/supervisor-gordon-mar-newsletter [https://perma.cc/ZV82-QBX8].  
83 The Uber Tax?, supra note 45.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Varghese, supra note 79. 
87 Paul Jones, Sponsor Postpones San Francisco IPO Tax Measure, TAX NOTES 
(July 23, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/employment-taxes/sponsor-
postpones-san-francisco-ipo-tax-measure/2019/07/23/29rl5 [https://perma.cc/X8AH-4FCW] 
[hereinafter Sponsor Postpones]. 
88 Joyce E. Cutler, Uber, Lyft Tax Headed for San Francisco Ballot in November, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 23, 2019, 4:56 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/ 
document/X5O5UPH8000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%2 
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The proposal would impose a tax on the customer for rides within San 
Francisco at a general 3.25% rate, with a preferential 1.5% rate for 
pooled rides and rides in zero-emission vehicles.89 If voters approve, 
the new tax would generate an estimated $32 million annually.90 
The San Francisco Board of Supervisors also proposed an 
“Excessive CEO Salary Tax,” with revenues dedicated to funding 
mental health services.91 The tax would mirror Portland, Oregon’s 
excessive CEO compensation tax, discussed below, although the tax 
base and rates would be much higher.92 San Francisco’s tax would 
impose an additional gross receipts tax on applicable businesses at rates 
ranging between 0.1% and 0.6%.93 The tax would generate an 
estimated $100 million annually.94 The proposal, like the IPO tax 
proposal, may appear on the November 2020 ballot individually or as 
part of the revised gross receipts tax proposal.95  
San Francisco also enacted two additional new taxes. The city 
enacted a new commercial rents tax in June 2018 to fund early 
childcare education.96 The new commercial rents tax imposes an 
additional gross receipts tax at a rate of 1% to 3.5% of the gross receipts 
a business receives for commercial rents.97 Finally, San Francisco 
enacted a real estate parcel tax on property owners to fund increased 
wages for teachers.98 The new tax is a flat $298 per parcel within the 
5200000016c1fddd5f8abfdfffd747d0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/WBP3-95ZK] [hereinafter 
Uber, Lyft Tax]. 
89 Joyce E. Cutler, Uber, Lyft Rides Could Be Taxed in San Francisco, BLOOMBERG L. 
(May 21, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBO5A97G00000 
0?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016adb86d65ca77ad 
baee36e0000#jcite [https://perma.cc/39UQ-74W4]. 
90 Uber, Lyft Tax, supra note 88. 
91 Joyce E. Cutler, San Francisco Proposed Excessive CEO Tax to Fund Mental Health, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 12, 2019, 7:45 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
X3O8G6H0000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001 
6b48ccd1c7a5ef78efb6000000#jcite [https://perma.cc/EYQ8-BY6V] [hereinafter San 
Francisco Proposed Excessive CEO Tax]. 
92 See infra Section I.G. 
93 San Francisco Proposed Excessive CEO Tax, supra note 91. 
94 Id. 
95 Varghese, supra note 79. 
96 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 21 (2019); Commercial Rents Tax, 
TREASURER AND TAX COLLECTOR, https://sftreasurer.org/business/taxes-fees/early-care-
and-education-commercial-rents-tax-cr [https://perma.cc/8KA4-5CG3].  
97 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 21 (2019). Gross receipts that are subject to 
the commercial rent tax are exempt from the homelessness gross receipts tax. Id.  
98 S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 16. 
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city, indexed for inflation.99 The tax is estimated to generate $50 
million annually.100 
4. A Comprehensive Business Tax Plan for San Francisco?
Business groups have been advocating for a comprehensive review
of San Francisco’s “complex patchwork” of business taxes, which 
currently generate more than $1 billion annually.101 Businesses have 
expressed frustration with “new one-off tax measures each election 
cycle.”102 A City Supervisor acknowledged the issues with the current 
tax regime, and stated, “You want the business community to have 
something that is stable and predictable and something that people can 
plan for.”103 A San Francisco business executive offered, “[San 
Francisco] may propose new taxes on businesses, which we’re not 
opposed to if part of a comprehensive plan.”104  
San Francisco Mayor London Breed and Board of Supervisors 
President Norman Yee announced that they are working on such an 
approach in conjunction with the City Controller.105 Together they plan 
to create one “comprehensive” tax regime for the November 2020 
ballot that will reflect substantial input from businesses, city officials, 
99 Id. Several other California cities had real estate taxes on recent ballots. Oakland 
voters passed a $198 parcel tax that is currently being challenged because it passed by only 
a simple majority. Joyce E. Cutler, Oakland, Calif., Council Votes Not to Collect Disputed 
Parcel Tax, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 17, 2019, 3:07 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
product/tax/document/XGE854C000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch 
=BNA%25200000016a22c5d821a1eba7e74e570000#jcite [https://perma.cc/LA57-KKB3]. 
Los Angeles voters rejected a real estate tax that would have provided additional education 
funding. Romy Varghese, Los Angeles Voters Reject School-Tax Deal That Ended Strike, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 5, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/ 
document/X84OMEIK000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%2 
5200000016b2822dcbdad6be86e3f360000#jcite [https://perma.cc/JDS5-H5ZR]. 
100 Fracassa, supra note 69.  
101 See, e.g., SF Launches Sweeping Review, supra note 50; Zieger, supra note 66. 
102 SF Launches Sweeping Review, supra note 50.  
103 Id.  
104 Zieger, supra note 66. Others are skeptical given the Board of Supervisors’ recent 
history of creating additional taxes beyond what businesses thought to be a comprehensive 
gross receipts tax regime that became effective in 2014. SF Launches Sweeping Review, 
supra note 50.  
105 Letter from Ben Rosenfield to John Arntz, supra note 58; Romy Varghese, San 
Francisco Voters to Decide on Business Taxes in Nov. 2020, BLOOMBERG L. (July 3, 2019, 
9:20 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/XERNGRF8000000? 
bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016bb899d252a96ffcb9dba 
20000#jcite [https://perma.cc/9YJR-Y2DB] [hereinafter San Francisco Voters]; SF 
Launches Sweeping Review, supra note 50. 
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and community leaders.106 Other City Supervisors have delayed 
targeted tax proposals, such as the IPO and excessive CEO 
compensation tax proposals, to accommodate the comprehensive 
analysis.107  
San Francisco’s focus is to revise the current gross receipts tax 
regime, with several laudable goals. The first stated goal is to “[c]reate 
a more efficient tax system that allows businesses in San Francisco to 
thrive, add jobs, and support the economic vibrancy. . . .”108 San 
Francisco hopes that its comprehensive tax proposal will ease 
administrative burdens, generate additional and more stable revenue, 
provide tax regime stability for business taxpayers, and avoid inhibiting 
economic growth in the city.109 The proposal will likely be a general, 
not special, tax to avoid any question about supermajority 
requirements. Localities and businesses will watch San Francisco’s 
progress closely, as San Francisco is likely to establish the tax trend for 
tech-heavy localities, especially in California.110  
C. Mountain View Transportation Infrastructure Tax
While Seattle and San Francisco are focused on combating the 
homelessness epidemic, other localities are focused on transportation 
infrastructure. The success of large businesses, primarily tech giants in 
Silicon Valley, resulted in exponential job growth within many 
localities. This job growth is overwhelming each respective locality’s 
existing transportation infrastructure.  
106 Letter from London Breed, S.F. Mayor, & Norman Yee, President, S.F. Bd. of 
Supervisors, to Ben Rosenfield, S.F. Controller (July 2, 2019); SF Launches Sweeping 
Review, supra note 50. 
107 Sponsor Postpones, supra note 87; Varghese, supra note 79. City Supervisor Haney 
stated that there needs to be additional funding for mental health programs sooner than 
November 2020, so the targeted tax trend may not be completely suspended in San 
Francisco. SF Launches Sweeping Review, supra note 50. 
108 Letter from Ben Rosenfield to John Arntz, supra note 58; San Francisco Voters, 
supra note 105. 
109 Letter from Ben Rosenfield to John Arntz, supra note 58. Stable revenues are crucial 
for localities. As business organizations caution, the economy is cyclical and if a downturn 
occurs, having high tax regimes is dangerous for cities. See, e.g., ‘Twitter’ Tax Break, supra 
note 44.  
110 Joyce E. Cutler, The More, the Better: San Francisco Leads New Kind of Tax Revolt, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 10, 2019, 1:46 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/ 
tax/document/XCNI1BVK000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA 
%25200000016bb8d4ddc5a1fbbedead610000#jcite [https://perma.cc/E65X-BGRH]. 
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Mountain View, California—home to Google—enacted a 
substantial per-employee tax targeted at large employers to fund 
transportation infrastructure needs.111 The tenor of the Mountain View 
targeted tax movement contrasted dramatically with those of Seattle 
and San Francisco. There are two primary reasons for the less 
confrontational experience in Mountain View. First, the locality’s 
primary motivation for the targeted tax was to generate revenue to 
mitigate the undisputed problem with projects that were identified and 
noncontroversial.112 There was much less public shaming and blame 
aimed at the large businesses throughout the process.113 Second, and 
likely more powerful, is that Mountain View does not have an existing 
gross receipts tax, unlike Seattle and San Francisco114 Thus, the per-
employee tax was not a new tax regime and compliance burden added 
to an already substantial local business tax regime. In fact, businesses 
supporting the Mountain View per-employee tax may have effectively 
preempted a local gross receipts tax, which would present an 
exponentially greater tax cost for the businesses. 
111 Information on November 2018 City Revenue Ballot Measures, CITY OF MOUNTAIN 
VIEW, https://www.mountainview.gov/depts/manager/2018_potential_general_revenue_ 
measures.asp [https://perma.cc/BV3V-F8MF] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020); November 6, 
2018, General Election, Official Final Results, SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., 
https://www.redwoodcity.org/departments/administrative-services/finance/taxes-assessments/ 
business-licensing [https://perma.cc/RF2M-Q4AB] (last updated Dec. 28, 2018). Other 
California cities have per-employee business licenses taxes, although they are generally 
nominal compared to Mountain View’s and capped at low annual amounts. See, e.g., 
Business License Tax Application, CITY OF SUNNYVALE, https://sunnyvale.ca.gov/ 
civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?t=45462.68&BlobID=25972 [https://perma.cc/WV5C-
ATXB] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020); Business License Tax, Tax Schedule, CITY OF REDWOOD 
CITY, https://www.redwoodcity.org/home/showdocument?id=18452 [https://perma.cc/ 
P6CJ-2CYD] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020); Business Tax Rates, SAN JOSE, CAL., https://www. 
sanjoseca.gov/your-government/departments/finance/business-tax-registration/business-tax- 
rates [https://perma.cc/7LMF-9Y5Q] (last visited Mar. 9, 2020); see also Council Report, 
Potential Revenue Measures for 2018 General Election, CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW (June 5, 
2018), https://mountainview.legistar.com/MeetingDetail.aspx?ID=603912&GUID=19EEF 
FF7-0DDD-4CAA-BFB7-9AECEEC8F59A&Options=info&Search= [https://perma.cc/ 
WE4J-BVQH] [hereinafter Potential Revenue Measures]; CITY MANAGER’S OFFICE/FIN. 
& ADMIN. SERVS, REVENUE MEASURE OPTIONS FOR POTENTIAL TRANSPORTATION OR 
OTHER CAPITAL PROJECTS (2017), https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/3f2d84bd-13ac-
42de-8d7b-9f93454ea4b6 [https://perma.cc/Q327-NP5A] [hereinafter REVENUE MEASURE 
OPTIONS]. 
112 See CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, RESOLUTION NO. 18239 (2018), https://www. 
mountainview.gov/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=26681 [https://perma.cc/ 
U3NJ-Y7RB] [hereinafter RESOLUTION]; CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, BUSINESS LICENSE 
TAX MEASURE P FACT SHEET (2018), https://www.mountainview.gov/civicax/filebank/ 
blobdload.aspx?BlobID=27147 [https://perma.cc/RFL4-3PBV] [hereinafter FACT SHEET]. 
113 See Hiltzik, supra note 25; Potential Revenue Measures, supra note 111. 
114 See MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., MUN. CODE CHS. 18, 29; RESOLUTION, supra note 112. 
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Mountain View voters passed the tax on November 6, 2018, with 
over 70% of voters supporting the tax.115 The tax is estimated to 
generate $6 million per year, with Google paying $3.3 million of that 
total.116 The Mountain View City Council indicated that it plans to 
direct 80% of the tax revenue to funding the city’s transportation 
infrastructure, although there is no explicit spending provision because 
the measure was designated as a general tax instead of a special tax to 
avoid California’s supermajority requirement.117 The City Council did, 
however, pass a resolution to direct 80% of the business license tax 
revenues to “transportation and innovative transit solutions to improve 
traffic congestion in the City of Mountain View.”118 Mountain View 
has been planning specific transportation infrastructure projects. For 
example, the Automated Guideway Transit project “is estimated to cost 
between $50 and $130 million per mile for the approximately 4–6 miles 
of transit being considered.”119 Mountain View would need an annual 
revenue stream of $4 million to service a $50 million bond if the city 
borrows to fund major projects.120 Mountain View designated the tax 
as a “business license tax.”121 The existing business license tax was a 
115 SANTA CLARA COUNTY, CAL., supra note 111. 
116 FACT SHEET, supra note 112; Voters in Google’s Hometown to Decide Employee 
‘Head Tax,’ WASH. POST (June 27, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/technology/voters-in-googles-hometown-to-decide-employee-head-tax/2018/06/ 
27/7b019a92-7a5b-11e8-ac4e-421ef7165923_story.html [https://perma.cc/KJ9R-D8SR]. 
117 RESOLUTION, supra note 112; FACT SHEET, supra note 112. Mountain View intends 
to direct 10% of the revenue to affordable housing programs and the resulting 10% to general 
operations. FACT SHEET, supra note 112; MOUNTAIN VIEW CITY COUNCIL, PRIMARY 
ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE P, https://www.mountainview.gov/civicax/filebank/ 
blobdload.aspx?BlobID=27123 [https://perma.cc/3P5T-WKZJ].  
118 RESOLUTION, supra note 112.  
119 REVENUE MEASURE OPTIONS, supra note 111. 
120 Id.  
121 MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., CITY CODE ch. 18, art. I (2019) [hereinafter Enacted 
Business License Tax Ordinance], https://www.mountainview.gov/civicax/filebank/ 
blobdload.aspx?BlobID=27111 [https://perma.cc/R3SG-NL9M]; FACT SHEET, supra note 
112. 
Although not targeted taxes, a few localities have longstanding per-employee “business 
occupation” or “local services” taxes. For example, Denver, Colorado, imposes on all 
businesses a $4 per month ($48 annually) tax per employee working in the city (and an 
additional $5.75 per month tax on the employee). DENVER, COLO., MUN. CODE art. VI, 
§ 53-296, art. V, § 53-241 (2019). Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, imposes on all employees
working in the city a $52 annual tax. PITTSBURGH, PENN., MUN. CODE § 252.02 (2019).
These taxes differ from the targeted taxes discussed in this Article in several important 
ways. First, the taxes apply equally regardless of business size. See, e.g., DENVER, COLO., 
MUN. CODE art. VI, § 53-292 (describing the intent of the tax to be “uniform and 
nondiscriminatory”). Second, the revenue has no specific, narrow spending designation. 
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flat $30 annually for most businesses, which had not increased since 
1954.122 The new tax is effective January 1, 2020, although it is being 
phased in over a three-year period for businesses with more than fifty 
employees in Mountain View.123 The provision imposes an initial $75 
flat fee on each business in Mountain View and then per-employee 
taxes at graduated rates ranging from $5 per employee to $150 per 
employee.124 The highest per-employee rate applies to businesses that 
have more than 5,000 employees in Mountain View, which affects only 
one taxpayer, Google.125 There are three other businesses—Symantec, 
Intuit, and Synopsys—that each have between 2,000 and 3,000 
employees in the city.126 The Mountain View City Council recognized 
that only seven companies report more than 1,000 employees, each of 
which would face an average cost per employee of $84 annually.127 
The $5 per-employee rate will apply to 94% of the businesses in 
Mountain View.128 The per-employee tax amounts are indexed for 
inflation.129  
Rather, the revenue is used to fund the general operation and welfare of the locality. See, 
e.g., DENVER, COLO., MUN. CODE art. VI, § 53-292; PITTSBURGH, PENN., MUN. CODE
§ 252.02(a). Third, the tax imposition amounts are much lower under these taxes than under
the targeted taxes proposed recently. Although the elasticity of these taxes is unclear, the
original Seattle per-employee tax amount would have been ten times the tax amounts that
Denver or Pittsburgh imposes on employers. Finally, these taxes have been in place for
decades. Denver’s business occupational privilege tax became effective in 1969.
Pittsburgh’s original occupation privilege tax became effective in 1965 and was replaced
with the local services tax in 2005. Because they have been in place for so long, businesses—
particularly tech businesses—were aware of these taxes before making substantial capital
investments in their respective localities.
122 CITY MANAGER’S OFFICE/CITY CLERK’S OFFICE/CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
CONSIDERATION OF TWO COUNCIL-INITIATED BALLOT MEASURES REGARDING  
CANNABIS GROSS RECEIPTS TAX AND THE BUSINESS LICENSE (2018), http:// 
mountainview.legistar.com/gateway.aspx?M=F&ID=68e19980-c209-4497-a88c-0e66d7d 
61d92.pdf%20 [https://perma.cc/VXH3-C3SK] [hereinafter TWO COUNCIL-INITIATED 
BALLOT MEASURES]. 
123 MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., MUN. CODE § 18.16(c) (2019); Enacted Business License 
Tax Ordinance, supra note 121; FACT SHEET, supra note 112. 
124 MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., MUN. CODE § 18.16(a); Enacted Business License Tax 
Ordinance, supra note 121. 
125 See Wendy Lee, The $5 Million Google Tax That Could Fix Every Silicon Valley 
Problem, S.F. CHRON. (May 6, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/ 
article/The-5-million-Google-tax-that-could-fix-every-12889554.php [https://perma.cc/ 
Q39M-F684]. Google would face an average per-employee tax of $117 annually. TWO 
COUNCIL-INITIATED BALLOT MEASURES, supra note 122. 
126 Lee, supra note 125. 
127 TWO COUNCIL-INITIATED BALLOT MEASURES, supra note 122. 
128 FACT SHEET, supra note 112. 
129 MOUNTAIN VIEW, CAL., MUN. CODE § 18.17; Enacted Business License Tax 
Ordinance, supra note 121. 
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In advance of the vote, Mountain View’s Mayor, Lenny Siegel, 
declared that the city had “too many good jobs” and that 
“[e]mployment is growing faster than we can house people and provide 
transportation for them.”130 He stated that “[t]he reason we have so 
many people on the freeway is because our companies are hiring, and 
hiring rapidly. They’re externalizing their costs by having the 
community pay for their transportation improvements and suffering 
their impacts.”131 On a softer note, Mayor Siegel deemed the 
transportation issue “perils of prosperity,” and recognized that 
Mountain View is “blessed with too many good jobs for the housing 
and transportation we have.”132 Mayor Siegel also expressly stated that 
Google has been a good corporate citizen for Mountain View.133 A 
survey of Mountain View voters in advance of the election showed that 
support for the measure was motivated by the sense that businesses 
should pay their fair share, while opposition was driven by concerns 
about hurting local businesses and general opposition to taxes.134 
Voters expressed that a lower tax for smaller businesses and a higher 
tax for larger businesses was the most appealing element of the 
measure.135 
Overall, there was very little opposition to the tax. Google was 
publicly silent, and there were some Chamber of Commerce comments, 
although mostly focused on smaller businesses.136 The City Council 
reported, “In general, members of the business community are not 
explicitly supporting or opposing the revenue measures but, rather, 
raised concerns and want to know more and understand the proposals. 
Most acknowledge that some increase is appropriate, given [that] the 
[business license tax] has not increased in decades.”137 
Google appears to acknowledge its impact on Mountain View’s 
transportation infrastructure and has made some effort to mitigate those 
130 Lee, supra note 125. 
131 Mark Noack, Council Backs Employee Tax That Would Cost Google Millions, 
MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE (June 7, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://www.mv-voice.com/news/2018/ 
06/07/council-backs-employee-tax-that-would-cost-google-millions [https://perma.cc/ 
9NEN-CP6Q]. 
132 Hiltzik, supra note 25. 
133 Id. 
134 TWO COUNCIL-INITIATED BALLOT MEASURES, supra note 122. 
135 Id. Leading up to the vote, Mayor Siegel suggested that Google pushed smaller 
businesses out of Mountain View. Lee, supra note 125. 
136 See Lee, supra note 125. 
137 Potential Revenue Measures, supra note 111. 
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issues. Google has funded the free Mountain View Community Shuttle 
since 2015, at a cost of approximately $2 million per year.138 The 
shuttle served over 200,000 passengers in 2018, and Google has 
committed to funding it through at least 2024. As part of Google’s 
recent office expansion in Mountain View, Google agreed to build 
10,000 housing units in the neighborhood, with 1,600 qualifying as 
“affordable housing.”139 Google also released a plan to build 20,000 
housing units in the Bay Area with at least 5,000 qualifying as 
“affordable housing.”140 
D. Cupertino Transportation Infrastructure Tax
For several years, Cupertino has been considering a targeted tax 
similar to Mountain View’s.141 The Cupertino targeted tax proposal 
would restructure the city’s “business license tax” to generate revenue 
more than ten times greater than does the current tax.142 Cupertino’s 
goal is “to generate $10 million annually to fund transportation projects 
to improve the City’s transportation infrastructure and alleviate local 
traffic congestion.”143  
138 Mark Noack, Google to Fund Free Shuttles Through 2024, MOUNTAIN VIEW VOICE 
(July 2, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.mv-voice.com/news/2019/07/02/google-to-fund-
free-shuttles-through-2024 [https://perma.cc/L8J7-BCAT]. 
139 Melia Robinson, Silicon Valley Might Get Some Relief from High Housing Prices—
Google Will Build Nearly 10,000 Homes Near Its New Campus, BUS. INSIDER 
(Dec. 13, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-is-building-homes-in-
mountain-view-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/X8SH-5NK3]; Melia Robinson, Google Said It 
Would Build 10,000 Units of Desperately Needed Housing in Silicon Valley—but There’s a 
Catch, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 28, 2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-
standoff-with-mountain-view-city-council-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/83K3-E9V7]; Ethan 
Baron, Google Demands More Office Space, Threatens to Block North Bayshore Housing, 
MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 27, 2017, 1:33 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/27/ 
google-demands-more-office-space-threatens-to-block-north-bayshore-housing/ 
[https://perma.cc/4ZZ7-SXK9]. 
140 Roland Li & Melia Russell, Google Wants to Build 20,000 Homes. It May Need More 
Than $14 Billion, S.F. CHRON. (July 1, 2019, 6:35 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
business/article/Google-wants-to-build-20-000-homes-It-may-need-14062529.php?psid= 
crEI3 [https://perma.cc/7Z3G-RJMT].  
141 See, e.g., Wendy Lee, Cupertino Mayor Pitches Business Tax, Not Afraid of Apple, 
S.F. CHRON. (Mar. 9, 2016, 7:17 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/ 
Cupertino-mayor-pitches-business-tax-not-afraid-6880870.php [https://perma.cc/4V5D-
YWED] [hereinafter Cupertino Mayor]. 
142 Proposed Business License Tax Measure, CITY OF CUPERTINO, https://www. 
cupertino.org/our-city/city-news/proposed-business-license-tax-measure [https://perma.cc/ 
76YF-N7CK] (last visited Jan. 18, 2020) [hereinafter Proposed Business License Tax 
Measure]. 
143 Id. 
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Cupertino released two potential tax proposals.144 Under each, 
businesses with fewer than 100 employees would pay only a flat fee 
ranging between $150 and $500 annually.145 Businesses with 100 
employees or more would pay the $500 flat fee plus an incremental tax 
for every employee above the ninety-nine employee threshold, the rate 
of which increases progressively as the employee count increases.146 
The annual per-employee tax would begin at $50 per employee 
annually and increase to either $325 or $425 per employee.147  
The proposal with the $425 per-employee top rate would generate 
just over $10 million annually, although $9.4 million would be paid by 
just one business.148 Apple is the only business in Cupertino that has 
more than 600 employees in the city, with approximately 24,000 
employees.149 Approximately thirty-two businesses have more than 
100 employees and would be subject to the per-employee tax to some 
degree.150 Roughly 99% of Cupertino businesses have fewer than 100 
employees and would pay only a nominal flat fee.151  
The atmosphere in Cupertino has been a bit more confrontational 
than in Mountain View, although a recent mayoral change may have 
eased the tension a bit. In 2016, when asked about Apple potentially 
migrating away from Cupertino in reaction to a new and significant 
targeted tax, former mayor Barry Chang stated, “If that happens, 
something better may come up.”152  
Complicating the situation in Cupertino, the city entered into an 
agreement with Apple in 1997 to entice Apple to stay and expand in 
the city, under which the city has paid Apple $70 million over the past 
twenty years.153 Cupertino pays Apple a portion of the sales tax 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id.; A Resolution of the City Council of the City of Cupertino, CUPERTINO CITY 
COUNCIL (July 3, 2018), https://cupertino.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=6334131& 
GUID=159507E5-ADBE-4B1F-AC04-D97CC4176ADA [https://perma.cc/6AX4-FVQK]. 
149 Proposed Business License Tax Measure, supra note 142.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Cupertino Mayor, supra note 141. Former mayor Chang did not address the potential 
difficulty of attracting new employers if the city’s largest employer claimed, accurately or 
not, that Cupertino’s excessive tax regime and hostile business environment drove the top 
employer out of the city.  
153 Laura Mahoney, Apple’s Hometown Pays $70 Million, and Counting, to Keep HQ, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 13, 2019, 1:46 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/ 
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revenue the city collects related to Apple’s sales that are sourced to 
Cupertino, which includes all Apple sales to California businesses.154 
Initially 50%, the percentage was reduced to 35% in 2013 as part of 
Apple’s agreement to build a 2.8-million square foot campus in 
Cupertino.155 The payments have been between approximately $4 
million and $6 million annually in recent years.156 When negotiating 
the agreement, former Apple CEO Steve Jobs told the City Council,  
We’re the largest taxpayer in Cupertino, so we’d like to continue to 
stay here and pay taxes . . . If we can’t then we have to go somewhere 
like Mountain View and we take our current people with us and we 
give up and over years sell the land here and the largest tax base 
would go away.157 
Despite the agreement, and in some ways because of it, the sales tax 
revenue generated by Apple’s sales account for nearly two-thirds of 
Cupertino’s overall sales tax revenue.158 The agreement will 
automatically renew until 2033, assuming Apple continues to complete 
specified construction projects in Cupertino.159 As part of building its 
new campus in Cupertino, Apple agreed to help fund road 
improvements to reduce traffic and agreed to traffic levels that the new 
development would generate.160 Current mayor Steven Scharf has 
credited Apple for not asking for additional incentives.161  
document/XEHF96H4000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA% 
25200000016b19b7d83da3fbdff704f50002#jcite [https://perma.cc/UW34-QV6N] 
[hereinafter Apple’s Hometown]. These agreements are common in California, with about 
10% of California cities using them to attract or retain large businesses headquartered in the 
city. See, e.g., Laura Mahoney, Apple’s 22-Year Tax Break Part of Billions in California 
Bounty, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 24, 2019, 8:05 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
product/tax/document/XCVQRBDO000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jc 
search=BNA%25200000016a09a6dcf2a97b99bf7d200002#jcite [https://perma.cc/ZT5M-
G5ZV] [hereinafter Apple’s 22-Year Tax Break]; Laura Mahoney, Lawyer Reaping Millions 
Over Decades as a Cut of Tax Incentives, BLOOMBERG L. (May 8, 2019, 1:45 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X66DM4UO000000?bna_news_filter=daily-
tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016a044fdce2a97b37cfb4ca0002#jcite 
[https://perma.cc/KET4-DSTX]; Editorial, A Very Modern Waste of Tax Dollars, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/opinion/california-sales-
tax.html [https://perma.cc/QR2C-RM5D].  
154 Apple’s Hometown, supra note 153; Apple’s 22-Year Tax Break, supra note 153. 
155 Apple’s Hometown, supra note 153. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. The agreement includes a sourcing provision that very generously sources certain 
Apple sales to Cupertino. Id. 
159 Id.  
160 Cupertino Mayor, supra note 141. 
161 Apple’s Hometown, supra note 153. 
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Cupertino ultimately suspended the per-employee tax proposal. In 
response to the proposal, Apple sent a letter to the Cupertino Mayor 
and City Council on July 30, 2018, offering to partner to work toward 
a mutually beneficial solution.162 The following day, Cupertino 
delayed presenting the tax proposal to voters until 2020 so the city 
could continue working with stakeholders to address the city’s 
transportation issues.163 Both parties appear to be working “as partners 
to create new transportation solutions.”164 Mayor Scharf wants to take 
a measured approach to a new per-employee tax because “[n]o city 
wants to be at a disadvantage.”165 As part of these discussions, Apple 
recently offered $9.7 million to fund five bicycle and pedestrian 
transportation projects, although Cupertino Vice Mayor Liang Chao 
expressed frustration with Apple, rather than the city, choosing the 
projects.166 As with the efforts in San Francisco, localities will be 
closely monitoring the progress of the tax discourse in Cupertino.  
E. New York City Transit Taxes
Unlike most West Coast tech cities, New York City’s transit system 
requires a massive capital influx largely due to decades of neglect and 
underfunding, not because of the meteoric growth of one employer in 
the city.167 The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), which 
162 Letter from Kristina Raspe, Vice President, Apple Inc., to Darcy Paul, Mayor, 
Cupertino, Cal., & Members of the City Council (July 30, 2018), https://www.cupertino.org/ 
home/showdocument?id=21886 [https://perma.cc/K8SW-DQCP] [hereinafter Letter from 
Kristina Raspe to Darcy Paul]. The letter pointed out that in constructing its headquarters in 
Cupertino, Apple was “glad to have invested more than $70M on public benefits.” Id.; see 
also Proposed Business License Tax Measure, supra note 142. 
163 Approved Minutes Cupertino City Council, CITY OF CUPERTINO, CAL. (July 31, 
2018), https://cupertino.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=613660&GUID=A1C18901-
B3F0-4281-A2D5-6AECF2523A69 [https://perma.cc/8AZS-ARX2]. 
164 Letter from Kristina Raspe to Darcy Paul, supra note 162. 
165 Joyce E. Cutler, San Francisco Bay Area Cooking Up Taxes for Upcoming Ballots, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 5, 2019, 12:18 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
X2LETTF4000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%252000000 
16b25c3d4f4a16f3fff84a70000#jcite [https://perma.cc/WFU3-XVGE] [hereinafter San 
Francisco Bay Area]. 
166 Apple’s Hometown, supra note 153. 
167 See, e.g., Paul Berger, New York’s Subway, Bus Overhaul Will Take 15 Years, 
Cost $43 Billion, WALL ST. J. (May 23, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-
yorks-subway-bus-overhaul-will-take-15-years-cost-43-billion-1527106797 [https://perma. 
cc/9V5W-XC64]; Henry Goldman, NYC Subway Chief Warns of ‘Death Spiral’ Without 
$40 Billion Fix, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2018-12-17/nyc-subway-chief-warns-of-death-spiral-without-40-billion-fix 
[https://perma.cc/K5RC-5RSQ] [hereinafter NYC Subway]; Aaron Gordon, The MTA’s Plan 
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operates New York City’s public transit system, is facing an operating 
deficit in 2022 of almost $1 billion.168 MTA Chief Andy Byford 
declared that either $40 billion must be invested in the transit system 
over the next decade or it will descend into a “death spiral.”169  
In 2019, New York State considered several tax proposals to help 
fund the MTA.170 Ultimately, New York State enacted two of the new 
proposals.171 First, New York City will be the first U.S. city to impose 
congestion pricing for vehicles entering certain areas of the city.172 
The congestion pricing regime will commence sometime between 
December 15, 2020, and January 30, 2021, and will generate an 
estimated $1 billion annually that will be used to fund the MTA.173 The 
congestion pricing amounts are not yet determined, but estimates are 
between $11 and $25 to enter the congestion zone in Manhattan.174  
New York State also enacted a supplemental “mansion tax”175 on 
purchasers of residential real property in New York City, effective July 
to Fix the Subway Will Cost a Fortune. Doing Nothing Will Cost Even More, GOTHAMIST 
(June 5, 2018, 10:32 AM), https://gothamist.com/2018/06/05/subway_fast_foward_cost. 
php [https://perma.cc/M8EH-Z7D8]. 
168 NYC Subway, supra note 167. 
169 Id.; Berger, supra note 167. 
170 New York State considered a “pied-à-terre tax,” which would have imposed a new 
tax on nonresident property owners in New York City if the residence was valued at 
more than $5 million. The tax would have generated an estimated $665 million annually. 
Prashant Gopal & Henry Goldman, NYC Brokers Say Pied-a-Terre Tax Is ‘Class Warfare’ 
on Rich, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 15, 2019, 2:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-03-15/nyc-brokers-see-new-threat-to-luxury-market-in-pied-a-terre-tax 
[https://perma.cc/L3R6-XAM8]; Henry Goldman, N.Y. Considers Taxing Non-Resident 
Owners of Luxury Apartments, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:05 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-07/n-y-considers-taxing-non-resident-
owners-of-luxury-apartments [https://perma.cc/99F4-85PP]; see infra Section III.C.2. 
171 S. 1509, S. Assemb. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted Apr. 12, 2019). 
172 Greg Clark, New York’s Congestion Pricing Plan May Be Stuck in Traffic, FORBES 
(May 16, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debtwire/2019/05/16/new-yorks-
congestion-pricing-plan-may-be-stuck-in-traffic/#66a56224d105 [https://perma.cc/4UM4-
GS6T]; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 700.1 et al. (2019), https://www. 
tax.ny.gov/pdf/rulemaking/aug0219/congestionsurchargepa/text.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7CMT-SWH3]. 
173 S. 1509, S. Assemb. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted Apr. 12, 2019); Clark, supra note 172.  
174 Clark, supra note 172.  
175 Although colloquially called “mansion” taxes, they often apply to modest housing in 
many high-cost areas such as New York City, where the median real estate sales price is 
approximately $1 million. See, e.g., DOUGLAS ELLIMAN REAL ESTATE, THE ELLIMAN 
REPORT: Q4-2018 MANHATTAN SALES (2019), https://www.elliman.com/pdf/6f02159 
fcaceff02d939a530048e75d6476cc739 [https://perma.cc/6KMT-V3ZX] [hereinafter THE 
ELLIMAN REPORT]; Emily Myers, Mansion or Not, You May Not Escape That So-Called 
Mansion Tax, BRICK UNDERGROUND (Apr. 25, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.brick 
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1, 2019.176 The existing mansion tax is triggered when the sales price 
exceeds $1 million.177 In such a case, New York State imposes a 1% 
tax on the entire sales price.178 The new supplemental mansion tax is 
triggered when the sales price exceeds $2 million.179 In such a case, 
New York State imposes an additional tax, the rate of which depends 
on the overall sales price. The rates range from 0.25% to 2.9% of the 
overall sales price.180 The supplemental mansion tax is estimated to 
apply to over 25% of residential real property sales in Manhattan and 
generate $365 million that will be used to fund the MTA.181  
Neighboring Connecticut also recently expanded its mansion tax 
by creating an additional marginal rate.182 The tax was 0.75% on the 
first $800,000 of a residential property’s sales price, and then 1.25% on 
the sales price above $800,000.183 Effective July 1, 2020, Connecticut 
will impose a 2.25% tax on the sales price of residential property 
that exceeds $2.5 million.184 Interestingly, Connecticut included a 
corresponding tax credit for the amounts paid under the new mansion 
tax if the seller maintains Connecticut residency for several years, 
underground.com/blog/2012/04/mansion_or_not_you_might_not_escape_paying_that_so_
called_mansion_tax [https://perma.cc/SPB5-LUML]. 
176 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1402-b(a) (2019). The revised mansion tax applies only to real 
estate sales in New York City. A group of Chicago Aldermen recently proposed an increased 
mansion tax to combat homelessness. The resolution would increase the real estate transfer 
tax on home sales greater than $1 million to 1.95% of the purchase price from the current 
rate of 0.75% of the purchase price. The additional revenue would be dedicated to the 
Homeless Transfer Tax Fund to provide resources for housing and services to combat 
homelessness. J. COMM. OF COMM. ON COMM. & RULES & COMM. ON FIN. R2019-595 (Ill. 
2019). 
177 N.Y. TAX LAW § 1402-a(a) (2019). New York tax law also imposes a broad “base,” 
and now “additional base,” real property conveyance tax, but at much lower rates than the 
mansion tax. See id. § 1402.  
178 Id. § 1402-a(a). 
179 Id. § 1402-b(a).  
180 Id. For example, if a residential property sold in New York City for $25 million, New 
York State would impose combined mansion taxes of 3.9%, or nearly $1 million, in addition 
to base and additional base conveyance taxes. 
181 Josh Barbanel, New Real-Estate Tax Hits Industry, $2 Million Homes, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 3, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-more-broad-based-real-estate 
-tax-hits-developers-11554303511 [https://perma.cc/7GQ9-LCDD].
182 Lauren Loricchio, Connecticut Enacts Budget with ‘Mansion Tax,’ Nexus Changes,
TAX NOTES (June 28, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/budgets/
connecticut-enacts-budget-mansion-tax-nexus-changes/2019/06/28/29nss [https://perma.
cc/6Q9T-U3JG]; H.B. 7424, Pub. Act No. 19-117 § 337 (Conn. 2019).
183 Loricchio, supra note 182. 
184 Id.  
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which effectively functions as an “exit tax.”185 The expanded mansion 
tax is estimated to generate just $6.3 million annually for the state.186 
F. “Millionaire” Taxes
The targeted tax focus on the East Coast has been “millionaire” 
individuals rather than large employers.187 New York City Mayor Bill 
DeBlasio unsuccessfully proposed a “millionaire tax” to fund the city’s 
more than $400 million commitment for short-term transit maintenance 
and improvements.188 Mayor DeBlasio proposed increasing New York 
City’s highest marginal income tax rate from 3.876% to 4.41% for 
individuals with taxable income greater than $500,000 and estimated 
the tax would generate $700 million to $820 million annually.189 
Several states have more successfully advanced millionaire tax 
proposals recently.190 The Massachusetts legislature voted to present 
a constitutional amendment to voters that would impose an annual 
4% surtax on individuals whose taxable income exceeds $1 million; 
the estimated $2 billion in annual revenue would be expressly 
earmarked for public education and transportation initiatives.191 
185 H.B. 7424, Pub. Act No. 19-117 § 337 (Conn. 2019). 
186 Keith M. Phaneuf & Maya Moore, House Adopts $43B Budget, Senate Approval 
Expected Tuesday, CT MIRROR (June 3, 2019), https://ctmirror.org/2019/06/03/house-
begins-debate-on-43-billion-two-year-budget/ [https://perma.cc/RN53-MDCZ].  
187 Although not a targeted tax because it applies equally to businesses of all sizes, Jersey 
City, New Jersey, recently enacted a 1% payroll tax on compensation paid to nonresident 
employees that perform services in the city or are supervised in the city. See Jersey City, 
N.J., Ordinance 18-133 (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.jerseycitynj.gov/UserFiles/Servers/
Server_6189660/File/City%20Hall/Tax%20Collections/Payroll%20Tax%20FAQ/Ord%20
18-133%20Payroll%20Tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG9Z-GYSH]. The New Jersey Superior
Court upheld the tax, which was estimated to generate $70 million annually that would fund
education, as constitutional. Mack-Cali Realty Corp. v. New Jersey, No. HUD-L-004903-
18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Mar. 15, 2019).
188 Madina Toure, What Will Save New York City’s Subways—Millionaires Tax or 
Congestion Pricing?, OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://observer.com/2018/03/ 
new-york-subway-millionaires-tax-congestion-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/L4PH-FHCV]. 
189 Id. 
190 Although colloquially called millionaire taxes, they often affect individuals with 
annual taxable income well below $1 million, and they are not based on wealth. 
191 Paige Jones, Massachusetts Legislature Approves Millionaire’s Tax, TAX  
NOTES (June 14, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/legislation-and-
lawmaking/massachusetts-legislature-approves-millionaires-tax/2019/06/14/29lxy [https:// 
perma.cc/KM3V-HD7U] [hereinafter Massachusetts Legislature]; S. DOCKET NO. 1709, S. 
NO. 16 (Mass. Jan. 18, 2019) (presented by Jason M. Lewis) (proposing a legislative 
amendment to the Constitution to provide resources for education and transportation through 
an additional tax on incomes in excess of $1 million). 
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Several procedural hurdles exist before the proposal can appear on a 
ballot, likely in November 2022.192  
The Illinois legislature voted to present a constitutional amendment 
to voters that would permit progressive income tax rates, and a 
corresponding pending bill would increase the current flat tax rate of 
4.95% to 7.75% for individuals with taxable income that exceeds 
$250,000.193 
Effective in 2018, New Jersey enacted a millionaire tax that imposed 
a 10.75% marginal income tax rate for individuals with taxable income 
exceeding $5 million.194 New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy 
unsuccessfully pushed to lower the threshold from $5 million to 
$1 million in 2019, which would have generated an estimated $447 
million annually.195 Governor Murphy’s initial plan was to use the 
additional tax revenue to fund property tax relief for middle-income 
New Jersey residents who were affected by the federal, state, and local 
tax deduction cap.196 
Although individual millionaire taxes are not the focus of this 
Article, they share many characteristics with targeted business taxes, 
including the tax policy deficiencies discussed below.197 The threat of 
taxpayer migration may be greater with individuals than with 
businesses, particularly with wealthy individuals who have the means 
192 S. DOCKET NO. 1709, S. NO. 16 (Mass. 2019) (presented by Jason M. Lewis).  
193 S.B. 0687, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019).  
194 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:2-1 (2018). 
195 Joseph De Avila, No Millionaire’s Tax in New Jersey Lawmakers’ Proposed Budget, 
WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2019, 6:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-millionaires-tax-
in-new-jersey-lawmakers-proposed-budget-11560807574 [https://perma.cc/7ESE-F9LN]. 
196 Lauren Loricchio, New Jersey Proposal Would Take from Millionaires, Give to 
Middle-Income Earners, TAX NOTES (June 5, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-
today-state/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/new-jersey-proposal-would-take-millionaires-give-
middle-income-earners/2019/06/05/2%25e2%2580%25a6 [https://perma.cc/YS4K-K532]. 
197 See infra Section II.A. 
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to migrate.198 And the migration threat is exacerbated significantly by 
the recent state and local tax deduction caps for federal tax purposes.199 
G. Portland Clean Energy and Excessive CEO Compensation Taxes
Portland voters enacted a targeted tax with a unique revenue
directive and tax structure.200 Portland’s tax targets large retailers 
selling goods into the city by imposing a gross receipts tax on Portland-
sourced retail sales. The tax revenue is expressly earmarked for clean 
energy projects and clean energy job training.201 Portland created this 
tax to effectuate its ambitious Climate Action Plan, which sets a goal 
of 100% of Portland’s electricity being derived from clean renewable 
sources by 2035.202  
198 See Cristobal Young et al., Millionaire Migration and Taxation of the Elite: Evidence 
from Administrative Data, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 421, 439 (2016) (“[State level] millionaire tax 
flight is occurring, but only at the margins of statistical and socioeconomic significance.”). 
Importantly, many of the factors preventing millionaire migration (e.g., owning a business 
in the state) may disappear as those millionaires approach retirement age. The results of this 
notable study, which analyzed 1999–2011, may also be much different now that the state 
and local tax deduction is capped for federal tax purposes beginning in 2018. And migration 
may actually be greater for individuals just below the millionaire tier that was analyzed, 
where the incremental tax savings (particularly considering the state and local tax deduction 
cap) may be much more meaningful. See also Many People Are Moving from California to 
Texas, ECONOMIST (June 20, 2019), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2019/ 
06/20/many-people-are-moving-from-california-to-texas [https://perma.cc/44UC-MDH6] 
[hereinafter ECONOMIST] (observing that 2.5% of California’s population—particularly the 
middle class—migrated out of the state between 2007 and 2016, with a quarter of those 
individuals migrating to Texas because of lower housing costs and taxes).  
199 See, e.g., Lee Miller & Wei Lu, Migration’s Biggest Loser Is Connecticut as Florida 
Profits, BLOOMBERG L. (May 24, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2019-05-24/migration-s-biggest-loser-is-connecticut-as-florida-profits [https:// 
perma.cc/LB9C-CYEP] (finding states losing the most net AGI were New York, Illinois, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and California; while the states gaining the most 
net AGI were Florida, Texas, Washington, and South Carolina). 
200 PORTLAND CLEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY BENEFITS INITIATIVE 2018 (2018), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/auditor/article/674246 [https://perma.cc/62VZ-8B8H]. 
Just over 65% of Portland voters approved the clean energy tax. MULTNOMAH COUNTY 
ELECTION RESULTS – UPDATE #17 FINAL SUMMARY: NOVEMBER 2018 GENERAL 
ELECTION, https://multco.us/file/76594/download [https://perma.cc/5GL4-DC9D]. 
201 Portland, Or., Ordinance 189389, Ordinance 189390 (Feb. 21, 2019) (codified at 
PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE chs. 7.02, 7.07, 5.04 (2019)); About the Portland Clean Energy 
Community Benefits Fund, PORTLAND.GOV, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bps/ 
article/713039 [https://perma.cc/P9YE-R3P4] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
202 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.07.010(A) (2019); History and Key Documents of 
Climate Planning and Action in Portland, PORTLAND.GOV, https://www.portlandoregon. 
gov/bps/article/531984 [https://perma.cc/P7CV-LJ8Z] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). 
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Portland’s clean energy tax is designated as a surcharge but 
functions as a gross receipts tax.203 The clean energy tax became 
effective January 1, 2019, and is in addition to Portland’s net income 
business license tax.204 The tax applies only to “large retailers,” which 
the Portland City Code defines as a business that has (1) at least 
$1 billion in annual gross income from retail sales worldwide and (2) at 
least $500,000 in annual gross income from retail sales sourced to 
Portland.205 For businesses subject to the tax, the rate is 1% of 
Portland-sourced retail sales gross revenue.206 Revenue estimates for 
the clean energy tax vary widely, from $30 million to $79 million per 
year.207 
Large retailers mounted a campaign against the tax, but proponents 
such as the Green Advocacy Project and Sierra Club effectively 
supported it.208 One of the most significant concerns was whether the 
tax incidence would ultimately fall on Portland consumers instead of 
the targeted large businesses—acting like a regressive sales tax. The 
provision itself contemplates retailers passing the tax through to 
consumers, and there is some early evidence of this pass-through 
occurring with certain sales.209 
Additional controversy surrounds the clean energy tax because the 
Portland Revenue Division proposed amendments to the tax provision 
that the Portland City Council adopted.210 Some of these amendments 
203 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F) (2019). 
204 Id.  
205 Id. § 7.02.100(N). One of the Portland City Council’s substantive amendments was 
to expand the threshold from $1 billion in retail sales nationwide to worldwide, thus 
expanding the tax net significantly. See Jennifer Young & Nikki Dobay, INSIGHT: 
Portland’s New Gross Receipts Tax Comes with Questions and Challenges, BLOOMBERG 
L. (May 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X89JIK6O
000000?bc=W1s…OoP5C1L4MmiqISYdyiYe6z1GbUaO6YVqxO1i_CCPn_QN1Xq_30t
2w%3D%3D [https://perma.cc/E52Z-H9RT].
206 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F)(2) (2019). 
207 Young & Dobay, supra note 205.  
208 Paul Shukovsky, Clean Energy Tax Gets Thumbs Up from Portland, Ore., Voters, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 7, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-
state/clean-energy-tax-gets-thumbs-up-from-portland-ore-voters?utm_source=twitter&utm 
_medium=taxdesk&utm_campaign=9am [https://perma.cc/4EY2-TDD3]. 
209 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F)(2) (2019); Rachel Monahan, Will the 
Portland Clean Energy Tax Be Passed on to Consumers? Check Your Trash Bill, 
WILLAMETTE WEEK (June 26, 2019), https://www.wweek.com/news/city/2019/06/26/will-
the-portland-clean-energy-tax-be-passed-on-to-consumers-check-your-trash-bill/ [https:// 
perma.cc/DA9J-26CW]. 
210 Portland, Or., Ordinance 189389, Ordinance 189390 (2019); PORTLAND CLEAN 
ENERGY COMMUNITY BENEFITS INITIATIVE 2018 (2018), https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ 
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are substantive and broaden the scope of the tax significantly.211 There 
is uncertainty as to whether the city council had the authority to adopt 
the amendments because the amendments reflected substantive 
changes to the provisions that voters originally approved.212  
Portland was also the first locality to enact an excessive CEO 
compensation tax to combat income inequality, effective January 1, 
2017.213 The tax applies only to publicly traded companies that are 
subject to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission pay-ratio 
reporting requirements and that are also subject to Portland’s business 
license tax.214 The provision operates as a surtax to Portland’s base net 
income business license tax.215 Businesses must pay an additional 10% 
if their CEO-to-median worker compensation ratio is equal to or above 
100:1 and 25% if their CEO-to-median worker compensation ratio is 
equal to or above 250:1.216  
Portland expects to collect approximately $2.5 million to $3.5 
million annually from its excessive CEO compensation surtax, with 
revenues used to fund general city operations.217 In its first year, the 
average payment for businesses subject to the surtax was just 
$15,800.218 Portland’s former mayor Charlie Hales stated, “Income 
inequality is real, it is a national problem and the federal government 
isn’t doing anything about it. . . . We have a habit of trying things in 
Portland; maybe they’re not perfect at the first iteration. But local 
auditor/article/674246 [https://perma.cc/2MST-FDKJ]; Letter from Nikki E. Dobay, Senior 
Tax Counsel, Council on State Taxation, to Thomas Lannom, Dir., City of Portland Revenue 
Div., (Jan. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Letter from Nikki E. Dobay]; Young & Dobay, supra note 
205. 
211 Portland, Or., Ordinance 189389, Ordinance 189390; PORTLAND CLEAN ENERGY 
COMMUNITY BENEFITS INITIATIVE, supra note 210; Letter from Nikki E. Dobay, supra note 
210; Young & Dobay, supra note 205. 
212 Letter from Nikki E. Dobay, supra note 210. 
213 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(E) (2019); Gretchen Morgenson, Portland 
Adopts Surcharge on C.E.O. Pay in Move vs. Income Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/business/economy/portland-oregon-tax-executive-
pay.html [https://perma.cc/ZEH7-Z2LN]; Mike Rogoway, Portland Expects Up to 
$3.5 Million from Unique CEO Tax, OREGONIAN (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.oregonlive. 
com/business/2019/02/portland-expects-up-to-35-million-from-unique-ceo-tax.html 
[https://perma.cc/X226-AMX9]. 
214 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(E) (2019); Business Tax Administrative Rule 
500.17-1, CITY OF PORTLAND, https://www.portlandoregon.gov/revenue/article/656905 
[https://perma.cc/CH4S-8YSW] [hereinafter Business Tax Administrative Rule] (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2020). 
215 PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(E) (2019). 
216 Id.; Business Tax Administrative Rule, supra note 214. 
217 Rogoway, supra note 213; Morgenson, supra note 213. 
218 Rogoway, supra note 213. 
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action replicated around the country can start to make a difference.”219 
Former city councilmember Steve Novick acknowledged, “It’s nice to 
have the money but the ultimate goal was not to raise money but get a 
precedent other jurisdictions would follow.”220 
Although this Article addresses local targeted taxes, it is important 
to note that Oregon recently enacted a state-level corporate activity tax 
targeted at large businesses.221 The controversial tax is estimated to 
generate $1 billion annually, although there are already calls to amend 
or repeal the tax.222 Thus, large businesses with sales into Portland, 
Oregon, are going to face two new significant gross receipt taxes, 
which may ultimately get passed on to consumers. 
II 
THE TROUBLE WITH TARGETED TAXES 
Targeted taxes have several tax policy and practical disadvantages. 
Most importantly, targeted taxes will likely have a negative economic 
impact. These taxes are unlikely to generate the anticipated additional 
revenue, and they will have an unintended distributional impact. The 
salience and incidence of these taxes will diminish their expressive 
effect. Large businesses will oppose targeted taxes because these 
provisions complicate tax regimes and the business environment and 
may be unconstitutional. In addition, targeted taxes raise the difficult 
question of whether they are more accurately characterized as a fee 
219 Morgenson, supra note 213.  
220 Rogoway, supra note 213. 
221 H.B. 3427, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); Paul Jones, Oregon Governor Signs 
New Gross Receipts Tax, TAX NOTES (May 20, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-
today-state/gross-receipts-tax/oregon-governor-signs-new-gross-receipts-tax/2019/05/20/ 
29j1w [https://perma.cc/QA66-77MZ]. Revenues are earmarked for education. Id. 
222 Paul Jones, Oregon Group Ends Gross Receipts Tax Referendum Effort, TAX NOTES 
(July 22, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/gross-receipts-tax/oregon-
group-ends-gross-receipts-tax-referendum-effort/2019/07/22/29r70 [https://perma.cc/S5RS- 
3SYB]; Paul Jones, Oregon Lawmakers Mull Changes to Gross Receipts Tax, TAX  
NOTES (June 11, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/exemptions-and-
deductions/oregon-lawmakers-mull-changes-gross-receipts-tax/2019/06/11/29lfm [https:// 
perma.cc/RPH5-RBZE]; Paul Jones, Oregon Lawmakers Mandate January Gross Receipts 
Tax Referendum, TAX NOTES (July 9, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
state/budgets/oregon-lawmakers-mandate-january-gross-receipts-tax-referendum/2019/07/ 
09/29pws [https://perma.cc/2VQ4-DBLZ]; Paul Shukovsky, $1.2 Billion Business Tax 
Facing Repeal Drive in Oregon, BLOOMBERG L. (June 24, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://news. 
bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/1-2-billion-business-tax-facing-repeal-drive-in-
oregon [https://perma.cc/EFC2-XN3U]. 
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rather than a tax. Fortunately, there are several alternatives to targeted 
taxes, discussed below, which minimize these concerns.223  
A. Negative Economic Impact
The overwhelming tax policy, and practical, drawback with targeted 
taxes is the negative economic impact. The locality—and its 
residents—have the most at stake. These taxes will fail to raise the 
desired revenue and may drive economic growth away from the 
locality, resulting in reduced revenue compared to the status quo. In 
addition, targeted taxes will likely have an undesired distributional 
impact. Employees are likely to bear the incidence of per-employee 
taxes, and residents are likely to bear the incidence of retail gross 
receipts taxes.  
1. Per-Employee Targeted Taxes
Business tax migration is much more practical at the local level than
at the state or federal levels.224 These localities are targeting at most a 
handful of large businesses. The Mountain View and Cupertino taxes 
would primarily affect just one business in each locality, Google and 
Apple, respectively.225 Such narrow targeting leaves the locality 
vulnerable, especially given the recent trend of large tech companies 
soliciting incentive offers from localities for headquarter expansion and 
relocation.  
Although a large business migrating out of a locality entirely is a 
possibility, the much more realistic threat is a business choosing to 
expand outside the locality. Not only does this type of migration 
sacrifice additional tax revenue and economic production directly but 
it also sends a powerful message to other businesses that may consider 
migrating into that locality. Amazon’s recent HQ2 expansion garnered 
widespread attention, but expansion is common and businesses 
consider many location options deliberately. Amazon initially chose to 
split its new headquarters, and 50,000 new workers, between New York 
City and northern Virginia.226 The New York City expansion plan drew 
223 See infra Section III. 
224 See Richard M. Bird, A New Look at Local Business Taxes, 30 TAX NOTES INT’L 695 
(2003).  
225 See supra Sections I.C, D. 
226 See, e.g., Spencer Soper, Amazon Scraps Plan to Build a Headquarters in New York 
City, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 9:07 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-02-14/amazon-says-it-won-t-build-a-headquarters-in-new-york-city [https://perma. 
cc/32MH-ZJUT]. 
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significant local opposition.227 When it appeared a New York State 
senator would block the agreed-upon incentive package, Amazon 
withdrew its planned New York City expansion.228 New York City’s 
messaging has dissuaded some businesses from expanding or 
relocating there.229 Amazon decided to distribute the 25,000 jobs 
planned for New York City to other cities, including Austin, Texas.230 
Amazon still plans to hire 25,000 workers in northern Virginia.231 
Google recently announced a $600 million expansion of its Oklahoma 
data center, where Google has already invested $2.5 billion and created 
400 jobs.232 Google is investing $13 billion in expansion across 
fourteen states.233 Apple is planning to invest $30 billion and “hire 
20,000 employees in the U.S. over the next five years” and is 
considering northern Virginia and North Carolina as sites for 
expansion.234 Uber is considering Dallas, Texas, for a $110 million 
expansion.235  
227 Id. 
228 Id. New York State Senator Michael Gianaris represented Long Island City, the 
location of Amazon’s planned New York City expansion. Senator Gianaris was an 
outspoken opponent of the expansion and voiced his commitment to prevent it. He was 
subsequently appointed to New York State’s Public Authorities Control Board, which would 
have had to approve the Amazon project unanimously. Id. 
229 See, e.g., Katia Porzecanski & Hema Parmar, Griffin Says Amazon Exit Curbed 
Interest in NYC Headquarters, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 14, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://news. 
bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report-state/griffin-says-amazon-exit-curbed-interest-in-nyc-
headquarters-1 [https://perma.cc/UP7G-ZG6A]. 
230 Matt Day, Amazon to Hire 800 Tech Engineers in Texas in Latest Expansion, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 28, 2019, 6:12 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2019-03-28/amazon-to-hire-800-tech-engineers-in-texas-in-latest-expansion 
[https://perma.cc/HK68-HMJE].  
231 Amanda Albright, Armed with Amazon HQ2, Arlington County to Tap Muni-Bond 
Market, BLOOMBERG L. (May 29, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
product/tax/document/X9R4HV4S000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state& 
jcsearch=BNA%25200000016b0439d49aa76f567dff580000#jcite [https://perma.cc/KZ8F-
U7JU] (suggesting Amazon’s expansion into Arlington County is generating benefits for 
the county’s municipal bond issuance).  
232 Paul Stinson, Google Expands Oklahoma Data Center with $600 Million Investment, 
BLOOMBERG L. (June 13, 2019, 3:43 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/ 
document/X8C4VMH0000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA% 
25200000016b5288d721adebffff36130002#jcite [https://perma.cc/AC6A-JZQ3].  
233 Id. 
234 Jessica Guynn & Mike Snider, It’s Not Just Amazon, Northern Virginia Also Wants 
a Bite of Apple, USA TODAY (May 16, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/tech/2018/05/16/apple-considering-northern-virginia-campus-20-000-employees/ 
615729002/ [https://perma.cc/E68K-BD7V].  
235 Paul Stinson, Dallas Approves $9.3 Million in Incentives to Lure Uber Hub, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 15, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/ 
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Even if the large businesses do not migrate their existing or 
expanded presence out of the locality, the targets are likely to mitigate 
their tax costs—thus reducing the locality’s tax revenues drastically—
using very simple techniques. First, although not publicized 
sufficiently, these large businesses already contribute significant 
funding to the targeted causes voluntarily.236 If the locality imposes a 
new tax earmarked for the respective cause, the large businesses may 
simply shift their existing voluntary contributions toward paying the 
tax, resulting in no net benefit.  
Second, per-employee taxes distort hiring behavior in the 
jurisdiction. Increasing per-employee costs serves a very clear 
deterrent effect. If a locality imposes a direct tax on employment, 
businesses will be deterred from creating new jobs, which may directly 
contradict state-level messaging and incentives.237 Additionally, per-
employee taxes result in lower-wage workers becoming proportionally 
more expensive relative to higher-wage workers. A $500 per-employee 
tax may represent a 2% increase in the cost of hiring a new janitor, but 
only a 0.2% increase in the cost of hiring a new software engineer. 
Providing a disincentive for these large businesses to hire lower-wage 
workers is counterproductive to reducing homelessness issues, 
particularly if job loss is indeed a significant cause. If localities want to 
incentivize hiring low-wage workers and disincentivize hiring high-
wage workers, a payroll tax would be much more effective, although 
the highest earners tend to be the executives who control business 
relocation decisions.238  
document/X4T1DG6O000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA% 
25200000016c96f9deaea97ff6ff32930001#jcite [https://perma.cc/JM2P-LYWX].  
236 See supra Sections I.A, C. 
237 See, e.g., Patrick Clark, Carlyann Edwards & Henry Goldman, Amazon Friction 
Rises in Virginia as Cuomo Woos Bezos to Return, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-01/amazon-friction-rises-in-virginia-
as-cuomo-woos-bezos-to-return [https://perma.cc/4QQW-VMGW] (“In New York, 
Governor Andrew Cuomo begged Amazon.com Inc. to reconsider its decision to back out 
of plans to bring 25,000 jobs to Queens after public criticism. . . .”); Kaitlin Lewis, 
California GO-Biz Approves Nearly $56 Million in Corporate Tax Credits, TAX  
NOTES (June 13, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/corporate-
taxation/california-go-biz-approves-nearly-56-million-corporate-tax-credits/2019/06/14/ 
29m4b [https://perma.cc/8VLV-VNAS] (announcing tax credits to bring nearly 7,000 new 
jobs to California). See also Erin Scharff, Preemption and Fiscal Authority, 45 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1270, 1273 (2018) [hereinafter Preemption and Fiscal Authority] (“[E]fforts to 
implement progressive policies at the local level have drawn the ire of state legislatures and 
governors.”).  
238 San Francisco moved away from its higher payroll tax in 2012 for exactly this reason. 
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Third, per-employee taxes encourage a workforce shift away from 
employees. Businesses can shift to independent contractors, 
outsourcing, or automation. The workforce shift could eviscerate 
projected tax revenues and affect current employees adversely if 
businesses substitute for the employment relationship. Those most 
likely to be replaced by independent contractors—or outsourcing 
arrangements or automation—are lower-wage workers, again 
exacerbating the problem the taxes are designed to alleviate. In 
addition, to prevent per-employee tax revenue decline resulting from a 
shift to automation, localities may have to impose complementary 
automation or “robot taxes,” further complicating the local tax 
landscape.239 And depending on the tax provision’s precise language, 
large businesses may be able to structure around the tax. For example, 
a business may be able to use affiliated entities as the formal employer 
to fall below application or rate increase thresholds. Seattle’s per-
employee tax encompassed affiliates, but only if they were a 
“paymaster.”240 At the very least, localities and businesses will waste 
resources disputing notoriously thorny worker classification issues.  
Finally, even if a business retains its existing employee workforce 
composition, the targeted tax will likely have a negative distributional 
impact. Businesses can easily shift the tax incidence to employees 
through lower wages or reduced benefits.241 Ultimately, the employees 
may bear the marginal tax costs.  
2. Gross Receipts-Based Targeted Taxes
Targeted taxes based on gross receipts derived in the locality will
likely increase the cost of goods and services for residents. For 
example, Portland imposes its gross revenue tax on retail sales into 
239 See, e.g., Orly Mazur, Taxing the Robots, 46 PEPP. L. REV. 277, 280 (2019). Chicago 
has already started considering “robot taxes.” Michael J. Bologna, Chicago Plan Could 
Curb Incentives for Tech Companies like Amazon, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:20 
PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/X69U9R3O000000?bna_ 
news_filter=daily-tax-report-state&jcsearch=BNA%252000000168eddcd863a57eefdfdef 
60000#jcite [https://perma.cc/S5KD-36B8].  
240 SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE tit. 5, ch. 5.37, § 020 (2018) (repealed). 
241 Wiji Arulampalam et al., The Direct Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages, 
56 EUR. ECON. REV. 1038 (2012) (concluding that approximately 50% of a corporate 
income tax increase is passed on to employees in the long run directly through lower wages, 
and an additional amount may be passed on indirectly); Clements Fuest et al., Do Higher 
Corporate Taxes Reduce Wages? Micro Evidence from Germany, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 393 
(2018) (concluding that 67% of a local business tax increase is passed on to employees 
directly through reduced wages). 
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Portland. Retailers may respond in several ways, all of which would be 
detrimental. Retailers could charge the additional tax amount to 
Portland consumers directly, or increase prices for sales into Portland, 
both of which would shift the tax incidence directly to Portland 
residents.242 Retailers could avoid selling into Portland altogether, 
which would likely increase prices due to reduced competition. Or 
retailers could increase the cost of goods universally to offset the 
Portland tax costs, resulting in retailers’ global customer bases 
subsidizing Portland’s spending.  
Of these potential responses, the direct pass-through to customers is 
most likely.243 The pass-through approach increases tax salience. It 
allows businesses to demonstrate very clearly the additional tax costs 
and that residents ultimately bear those costs. Residents may initially 
direct their disapproval toward the business, but if businesses adopt this 
approach universally, residents’ only viable response may be blaming 
the local politicians who created the tax. Businesses quickly adopted 
this pass-through approach in response to France’s recent targeted 
digital tax, which functions similarly to Portland’s retail gross receipts 
tax.244 Almost immediately after France enacted the tax, Amazon 
announced that it would pass the 3% gross receipts tax through to its 
French customers.245 Because of gross receipts-based targeted taxes’ 
distributional impact and salience, these taxes will likely produce 
negative economic and political ramifications. 
In addition, with any gross receipts-based tax, businesses have an 
incentive to source the receipts outside the taxing jurisdiction. Even 
with a shift to market-based sourcing, determining source is complex 
and is one of the most disputed issues in state and local taxation. If the 
gross receipts tax is substantial enough, it may be worthwhile for 
businesses and their consumers to structure transactions so that the 
transactions are properly sourced outside the taxing jurisdiction. This 
structuring is easier to effectuate at the local level than the state level 
242 Portland’s tax code expressly contemplates retailers separately stating the tax amount 
on customer invoices. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F)(2) (2019). 
243 Many businesses are accustomed to separately stating taxes that they pass through to 
customers, as many states have statutory requirements to do so for sales and use tax 
purposes.  
244 Todd Buell, Amazon Raising Fees on French Sellers After Digital Tax, LAW360 
(Aug. 1, 2019, 1:12 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184355/amazon-raising-fees-
on-french-sellers-after-digital-tax [https://perma.cc/JYM4-UPS6]. In this case, Amazon’s 
customers are retailers, so the new 3% fee places these French retailers at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to retailers in other countries. Id.  
245 Id. 
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and would likely result in sourcing the transaction outside the locality 
for sales tax purposes as well.  
The potential negative economic impact alone should dissuade 
localities from pursuing targeted taxes if their primary goal is to 
generate additional revenue. Importantly, negative economic impact is 
much more likely if the tax regime is overly complex and presents 
substantial administrative and compliance burdens.  
B. Complicating Tax Regimes and the Business Environment
Certainty is the paramount tax concern for large businesses, 
followed closely by managing administrative and compliance 
obligations.246 Actual tax liability is a much less significant concern, 
especially if the tax is equally applicable to its competitors and the tax 
can be passed through to consumers.  
These priorities help explain the large businesses’ reactions to local 
targeted tax proposals. The strongest opposition arose in Seattle and 
San Francisco, each of which already has at least one business tax 
regime. The targeted businesses already pay tens of millions of dollars 
under the existing regime—or regimes, in San Francisco’s case—and 
incur significant administrative and compliance costs associated with 
each tax regime.247  
In contrast, the targeted businesses in Mountain View and Cupertino 
did not launch fervent public campaigns opposing the targeted tax. 
There are several reasons underlying their reaction, but a major factor 
is that neither city has an existing business gross receipts or payroll tax. 
Thus, the proposed tax would be the first real business tax imposed on 
the large businesses in each respective city. It is still advisable to take 
a mindful approach to designing that tax properly at the outset, as 
Cupertino and Apple are attempting, to avoid the situation in San 
Francisco that can create mistrust and acrimony between the locality 
and the businesses.  
246 See generally David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal 
Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 751 (2010) (“[Economists] typically agree that 
unstable tax policies . . . are economically harmful” and that even Adam Smith recognized 
the intrinsic value of tax certainty, declaring that it was a “matter of so great importance that 
a very considerable degree of inequality . . . is not near so great an evil as a very small degree 
of uncertainty.”). 
247 A San Francisco tech executive stated that it is “easier to do business in Cuba than 
San Francisco.” ECONOMIST, supra note 198. 
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San Francisco and its large businesses came together just seven years 
ago to fix its complex patchwork of counterproductive tax regimes, 
most notably the city’s significant payroll tax. The solution was a gross 
receipts tax—itself complicated—that would replace the payroll tax 
and leave businesses to comply with just one primary business tax. San 
Francisco, however, did not phase out the payroll tax as agreed. The 
city not only retained it but enacted an additional gross receipts tax and 
proposed at least three more business taxes. The city and its businesses 
had an understanding, which gave the businesses tax certainty, and the 
city was reneging. San Francisco appears to have reset the dialogue, 
and ideally one revised comprehensive business tax regime will emerge 
as a result. Nevertheless, the experience in San Francisco provides a 
valuable lesson. 
Businesses are concerned not just with new additional targeted tax 
regimes within one jurisdiction, but also on a broader scale across the 
country.248 As discussed below, the objectives of Portland’s excessive 
CEO compensation tax are to signal its condemnation of income 
inequality and provide a blueprint for other states and localities to do 
the same.249 Indeed, San Francisco proposed a tax that mirrored 
Portland’s, but with much higher rates.250 If every locality adopted just 
one targeted tax, large businesses could face compliance obligations 
for thousands of new complicated taxes. The administrative and 
compliance burden associated with a novel targeted tax regime may 
cost millions and require a business to reengineer its internal 
systems.251 These compliance costs, and possibly even the tax costs, 
are likely to be passed on to employees or consumers.252 Cumulative 
248 See Erin Adele Scharff, Powerful Cities: Limits on Municipal Taxing Authority and 
What to Do About Them, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 292, 331 (2016) (“The more the tax laws of 
these jurisdictions differ from each other, the more costly it is for multijurisdictional 
taxpayers to comply.”). 
249 See infra Section II.D. 
250 As another example, many U.S. cities are observing Vancouver’s vacant home tax 
experience with thoughts of adopting a similar provision. See infra Section III.C.2. 
251 See, e.g., Isabel Gottlieb, Big Tech Frets over French Digital Tax Compliance 
Headaches, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 15, 2019, 1:45 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X4CT0QO000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-international&jcsearch= 
BNA%25200000016c8c42da22a7ffac431c150001#jcite [https://perma.cc/39W3-VUTJ]; 
Isabel Gottlieb, Facebook Must ‘Reengineer’ to Comply with French Digital Tax, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 12, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
XFBNUUSO000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-international&jcsearch=BNA% 
25200000016c8765db91ad7df76d31dd0001#jcite [https://perma.cc/M3EY-QAD9]. 
252 Somebody must bear these additional costs, whether it be consumers, employees, or 
shareholders. See Bird, supra note 224. Based on ability-to-pay principles, shareholders are 
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tax compliance burdens may even justify striking down targeted tax 
provisions under the Dormant Commerce Clause.253  
These targeted taxes present unique complexities that will create 
administration costs for the locality and compliance costs for the 
taxpayers—costs that could be better used actually combating the 
reason for the tax.  
C. Constitutional Considerations
Targeted taxes may also violate both the U.S. Constitution and the 
respective state’s constitution, depending on how the taxes are 
structured. The most pertinent constitutional restriction is uniform 
taxation. Most state constitutions include some type of tax uniformity 
clause.254 These uniformity clauses vary considerably across the states, 
and many apply only to property taxes.255 State courts tend to interpret 
uniformity clauses broadly, and although taxpayers may also raise state 
and federal Equal Protection Clause challenges, taxpayers are more 
likely to be successful with a state uniformity challenge to these 
targeted taxes.256 The overarching uniformity and equal protection 
inquiries are whether the taxing jurisdiction properly determined each 
taxpayer class, and whether it applies the tax uniformly across that 
class.257  
Most relevant to the targeted taxes discussed above, it is unclear 
whether a taxing jurisdiction can justify disparate tax treatment based 
on taxpayer size without violating the state constitution’s uniformity 
clause.258 Both Georgia and Pennsylvania, which have broad 
uniformity provisions that apply beyond property taxes, have addressed 
generally the group best suited to bear these costs. With tech companies, however, there is 
a significant working-class population that falls into two or even three of these categories. 
253 See infra Section II.C; Hayes R. Holderness, Navigating 21st Century Tax 
Jurisdiction, MD. LAW REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 38).  
254 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE TAXATION ¶ 2.01 (3d ed. 2019). Neither 
New York nor Connecticut have constitutional tax uniformity provisions. Id. 
255 Id. ¶¶ 2.01, 2.06. Importantly, some courts have characterized net income taxes as a 
type of property tax. Kunath v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (citing 
Culliton v. Chase, 25 P.2d 81 (Wash. 1933)).  
256 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 3.04[1][c]. 
257 Id. ¶ 2.06; Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 787 N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ill. 2003).  
258 The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an advisory opinion to the New 
Hampshire legislature concluding that imposing different property tax rates based on 
taxpayer size would violate the state’s uniformity clause unless there was a “valid reason” 
justifying the disparate treatment. See Opinion of the Justices, 386 A.2d 1273, 1275 (N.H. 
1978). 
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the issue.259 The Georgia Supreme Court held that a business license 
tax violated the state constitution’s uniformity provision because the 
tax imposed a greater flat charge if a business reached a certain 
employee threshold.260 The court did, however, recognize that a 
reasonable justification for a size-based class is that larger businesses 
have greater ability to pay and produce greater regulatory costs for the 
locality.261 Both the Georgia Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court struck down business license taxes because the 
provisions exempted taxpayers that had gross receipts below a certain 
threshold.262  
These decisions are most relevant to Oregon’s targeted taxes 
because Oregon has a similarly broad uniformity provision.263 
Portland’s clean energy tax applies only to retailers, not to other types 
of businesses such as manufacturers. The tax also applies only to large 
businesses, based on retail gross income. Portland’s only stated 
justifications for these distinctions were that “[l]arge retail businesses 
. . . generat[e] a substantial portion of the City’s overall greenhouse 
gas emissions,” and that large retailers have both the “inherent 
responsibility and the financial capacity” to pay the tax.264 Portland 
may find it difficult to defend the tax provision’s uniformity based on 
these justifications. It is doubtful that Portland could assert, for 
example, that a manufacturer located in Portland contributes less to the 
city’s carbon footprint than an out-of-state retailer that merely sells 
259 GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, ¶ III(a); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. These broad provisions 
require that taxes be imposed uniformly upon the same class of subjects, rather than 
property. 
260 Pharr Road Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 S.E.2d 333, 335–36 (Ga. 1968). The court 
suggested that a tax that imposed a certain rate per employee up to a threshold, and then a 
higher amount per employee that exceeds that threshold, would pass muster. Id.; see also 
Ping v. City of Cortez, 342 P.2d 657, 659 (Colo. 1959) (holding a uniform per-employee 
business license tax did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
261 Pharr Road Inv. Co., 162 S.E.2d at 335. 
262 Id.; see Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964); cf. City & 
County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 450 P.2d 339, 344 (Colo. 1969) 
(determining that under the Equal Protection Clause a similar exemption “is not arbitrary 
and is reasonable”). 
263 OR. CONST. art. I, § 32. Notably, California and Washington have uniformity 
provisions that are limited to property tax (although Washington defines “property” 
broadly). CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1–2. New York, by contrast, 
does not have a uniformity provision. 
264 PORTLAND CLEAN ENERGY COMMUNITY BENEFITS INITIATIVE 2018 (2018), 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/auditor/article/674246 [https://perma.cc/Q334-WGA7].  
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products to Portland customers.265 Thus, there may be forthcoming 
uniformity challenges to Portland’s recently enacted targeted tax.  
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from making 
unreasonable tax classifications, which is a fairly lenient standard for 
taxing jurisdictions.266 The U.S. Supreme Court will generally analyze 
whether “the State’s classification is ‘rationally related to the State’s 
objective.’”267 If the taxing jurisdiction presents a reasonable 
justification, the U.S. Supreme Court will generally sustain the tax even 
if it is discriminatory.268 Although there is some mixed precedent, a 
modern U.S. Supreme Court would likely uphold an Equal Protection 
Clause challenge of a tax distinction based on a business’s number of 
locations or amount of gross receipts.269  
With that said, state courts have been more likely than the U.S. 
Supreme Court to find that taxes violate the state or federal Equal 
Protection Clause.270 A state court may be more comfortable analyzing 
the state constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution, which also 
allows the state court to deviate from U.S. Supreme Court Equal 
Protection Clause precedent.271 And, although some state courts may 
assert that uniformity clause and Equal Protection Clause standards are 
essentially identical, it appears taxpayers may have more success with 
state uniformity clause challenges.272 
Of course, no contemporary constitutional analysis is complete 
without at least a brief Commerce Clause discussion. The U.S. 
265 The comparison could be even more stark if that out-of-state retailer sold expensive 
products, such as pianos or artwork. That retailer may make only a handful of sales into 
Portland but exceed the $500,000 threshold because of the high per-item price. 
266 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 3.02. 
267 Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 199 (1979) (quoting Mass. Bd. of 
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 315 (1976)). 
268 Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526–27 (1959). 
269 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 3.03[5], [6]. 
270 See id. ¶ 2.06[2]. Hellerstein recognizes that “some state courts appear to be more 
sympathetic than the U.S. Supreme Court to equal protection challenges to state tax 
classifications.” Id. ¶ 3.04[1]. 
271 State courts are bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent while applying the U.S. 
Constitution but are not so bound when applying the state’s constitution. Id. ¶ 3.04[1]; see 
generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. 
REV. 1195 (1985). 
272 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 3.04[1][c]; Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 
787 N.E.2d 786, 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (“The uniformity clause was intended to be a 
broader limitation on legislative power to classify for nonproperty tax purposes than the 
limitation of the equal protection clause . . . .”). If the state or local charge is a tax and not a 
fee, the challenge must be litigated in state, not federal, courts. See infra Section II.E.2. 
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Supreme Court established the Dormant Commerce Clause analytical 
framework for state and local taxes in Complete Auto Transit v. 
Brady.273 The four-prong test provides that the tax must (1) be applied 
to an activity that has a substantial nexus with the jurisdiction, (2) be 
fairly apportioned to activities carried on by the taxpayer in the 
jurisdiction, (3) not discriminate against interstate commerce, and 
(4) be fairly related to services provided by the jurisdiction.274 The
substantial nexus prong has been the subject of considerable dispute in
the past. Regarding the targeted taxes discussed above, however, the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,
reduces the likelihood of substantial nexus challenges.275
There are plausible arguments that each of the targeted taxes violates 
the discrimination prong, but Portland’s clean energy tax is again the 
most suspect constitutionally. Because of the tax’s application 
threshold, over $1 billion in global retail gross income and $500,000 in 
Portland-sourced retail gross income, it will apply primarily to large 
national or international businesses and not to local Portland-based 
businesses.276 In effect, the tax will apply only to businesses engaged 
in interstate commerce and not to businesses engaged solely in 
intrastate commerce.277 Thus, Portland’s tax arguably discriminates 
against interstate commerce.  
Portland’s clean energy tax may also violate the “fairly-related” 
prong. Successful challenges under Complete Auto’s fourth prong are 
rare.278 The U.S. Supreme Court does not look to the amount of the tax, 
or the value of the benefits provided.279 Rather, the Court looks to 
“whether the measure of the tax [is] reasonably related to the extent of 
the contact, since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the 
273 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1977). 
274 Id. at 277–79. Fittingly, the Court recognized that “[a] tailored tax, however 
accomplished, must receive the careful scrutiny of the courts to determine whether it 
produces a forbidden effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 289. 
275 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). Given certain facts, a taxpayer 
may be able to challenge the targeted taxes under the “substantial nexus” or “fairly 
apportioned” prongs. However, this Article focuses on the “discrimination” and “fairly 
related” prongs, as they present broader constitutional concerns in the context of the targeted 
taxes discussed above.  
276 The distinction between retailers and non-retailers may also present as applied 
discrimination challenges. 
277 For example, the tax would apply to large online booksellers such as Amazon, but 
not to local independently owned bookstores (which, contrary to popular belief, do still 
exist).  
278 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 4.18[2][d]. 
279 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625 (1981). 
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state that may properly be made to bear a ‘just share of state tax 
burden.’”280 This framework incorporates the fundamental assumption 
that the “measure of a tax is reasonably related to the taxpayer’s 
activities or presence in the state—from which it derives some benefit 
such as the substantial privilege of [doing business].”281 Crucially, the 
Court designed this standard in the context of general taxes.282 To date, 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has categorized levies as general 
revenue measures or as user charges, but the targeted tax movement 
may necessitate a third category for special taxes, such as Portland’s 
clean energy tax.  
Portland imposes a general business license tax, the revenues from 
which fund general municipal infrastructure that affords businesses the 
privilege of deriving economic benefit in the city. In contrast, the new 
Portland clean energy tax is not a general tax but a separate, special tax 
with revenues dedicated to clean energy projects in Portland.283 Many 
businesses subject to the tax—primarily out-of-state retailers—could 
reasonably assert that they derive no discernible benefit from clean 
energy projects in Portland. Unlike the Portland general business 
license tax, the Portland clean energy tax may not be fairly related to 
the services and benefits Portland provides to those businesses subject 
to the tax.284 
Finally, each of the targeted taxes discussed above may unduly 
burden interstate commerce under the reinvigorated Pike balancing 
test.285 Although the Wayfair Court suggested that the Pike balancing 
test may play a larger role in Dormant Commerce Clause challenges 
moving forward, it has traditionally been eschewed in state and local 
tax jurisprudence and diminished generally.286 In Pike, the Court 
280 Id. at 626 (quoting W. Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)) 
(emphasis in original). 
281 Id. at 628–29 (emphasis added). 
282 Id. at 622–24. The purpose of the general taxes at issue were to provide “police and 
fire protection” and other “advantages of civilized society.” Id. at 627 (quoting Exxon Corp. 
v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980)).
283 See supra Section I.G.
284 The primary benefit Portland provides to large out-of-state retailers is the
infrastructure to deliver goods to customers in the city. The costs associated with this benefit 
are already reimbursed through Portland’s general business license tax. 
285 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
286 Walter Hellerstein & Andrew Appleby, Substantive and Enforcement Jurisdiction in 
a Post-Wayfair World, 90 ST. TAX NOTES 283, 292 (2018); Brannon P. Denning, 
Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 
493–94 (2008). 
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established the following balancing framework to analyze Commerce 
Clause challenges:  
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate 
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question 
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.287 
Each of the targeted taxes discussed above has a local purpose that is 
at least legitimate. Indeed, many of their respective purposes are 
crucial. Thus, the resulting inquiry is twofold: whether the burdens 
imposed on taxpayers outweigh the respective purpose; and if not, 
whether the locality’s purpose could be accomplished just as well in a 
less burdensome manner.288  
In the context of targeted business taxes, the most significant and 
realistic burden relates to compliance. As discussed above, the 
compliance burdens for novel targeted taxes can be immense and cost 
millions.289 These burdens are compounded when taxpayers must 
comply with multiple targeted taxes, whether within one jurisdiction or 
across many.290 The cumulative compliance burdens could potentially 
outweigh the local benefits, although that argument is tenuous, 
especially for large multinational businesses.291 However, the localities 
may be able to accomplish their stated purpose just as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate commerce, as this Article proposes below.292 For 
example, San Francisco could simply increase the rate of its existing 
gross receipts tax instead of creating several new taxes.293 Based on 
287 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). 
288 Assuming targeted business taxes are applied even-handedly, and the interstate 
commerce effects are merely incidental. 
289 See supra Section II.B. 
290 See Holderness, supra note 253 (manuscript at 38–40) (discussing cumulative 
compliance burden theory). 
291 One could also argue that the effect of these cumulative compliance burdens on 
interstate commerce is beyond “incidental.” For example, if out-of-state retailers were to 
withdraw from the Portland market because of the compliance burdens associated with the 
targeted tax, there would be a significant effect on interstate commerce. 
292 See infra Sections III.A, B. 
293 A locality could also reduce taxpayers’ compliance burdens by conforming to state-
level tax regimes. For example, Portland could conform its clean energy tax to Oregon’s 
commercial activity tax structure. 
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longstanding judicial reluctance to apply the inherently nuanced Pike 
balancing framework in the tax context, it may be difficult for a 
taxpayer to succeed on this basis. Regardless, targeted taxes present 
legitimate constitutional concerns, particularly as to uniformity and 
equal protection.  
D. Additional Policy Considerations: Crises and Revenue-
Raising Constraints 
Despite targeted taxes’ myriad deficiencies, there are policy 
considerations that explain why localities have recently gravitated 
toward them. As an overarching matter, the problems that the localities 
are targeting have reached crisis levels in many cases.294 In San 
Francisco, residents, tourists, and the tech talent pool are being repelled 
by the escalating homelessness condition.295 Infectious diseases, 
particularly hepatitis A and medieval-era typhus, are spreading at an 
alarming rate for those experiencing homelessness on the West 
Coast.296 The localities are in a precarious position. If they do not solve 
these problems quickly, or if they impose overbearing and poorly 
designed taxes, there will be dire economic repercussions.  
Making matters more difficult for localities, state constitutions 
and statutes restrict localities’ abilities to raise revenue. For example, 
California imposes several property tax limitations and a supermajority 
approval requirement for local, special taxes.297 Washington’s 
constitution generally prohibits income taxes, although a uniform 
294 See Jeremy Pilaar, Starving the Statehouse: The Hidden Tax Policies Behind States’ 
Long-Run Fiscal Crises, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 353–55 (2018) (describing the past 
forty years as a “Retrenchment Age” of transportation infrastructure expenditures at the state 
level). 
295 See, e.g., Matier & Ross, supra note 52; S.F., CAL., BUS. & TAX REGS. CODE art. 28, 
§ 2802(i) (2019).
296 See Anna Gorman & Kaiser Health News, Medieval Diseases Are Infecting
California’s Homeless, ATLANTIC (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/ 
archive/2019/03/typhus-tuberculosis-medieval-diseases-spreading-homeless/584380/ 
[https://perma.cc/CU2M-LFKC]. 
297 California voters have not shown sufficient support to remove property tax 
limitations for commercial properties. Romy Varghese, California Bid to Change Business 
Taxes Drawing Mixed Reviews, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 7, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://www. 
bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/XC4I0JBK000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-
report-state&jcsearch=BNA%252000000168c8fbd052a5edfeffd9020000#jcite 
[https://perma.cc/R9RB-U6KP].  
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income tax may be a possibility for Seattle in the future.298 And 
Oregon’s constitution includes a broad tax uniformity requirement.299 
Despite these limitations, there are viable options that accomplish the 
localities’ revenue-raising goals without targeted taxes’ practical and 
policy drawbacks, as discussed below.300  
If a locality’s primary goal is not to raise revenue, but to recognize 
a latent issue and present a blueprint for a potential nationwide solution, 
targeted taxes may be an effective approach. Portland has openly 
adopted this approach, particularly with its surtax on excessive CEO 
compensation.301 The surtax generates nominal revenue, but clearly 
signals Portland’s commitment to mitigating income inequality.302 
Portland’s goal is for other jurisdictions to adopt a similar provision.303 
If the movement reaches critical mass, large businesses may begin to 
prioritize the issue. This local-to-national signaling strategy has been 
successful in other contexts recently, notably with bans on single-use 
plastic bags and foam food containers and cups.304 This approach 
sacrifices additional revenue, and possibly even the locality’s 
economic health. But that sacrifice actually amplifies the message, 
signaling that the locality values certain principles more than economic 
prosperity.  
E. Blurring the Tax Versus Fee Distinction
The nature of these targeted taxes, particularly the revenue 
hypothecation to a specific program or fund, necessitates a tax versus 
298 See Kunath v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 1235 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019) (holding that 
Seattle had authority to impose a net income tax that is actually a property tax but that the 
Washington Constitution requires the tax to be uniform). 
299 OR. CONST. art. I, § 32.  
300 See infra Section III. 
301 See Preemption and Fiscal Authority, supra note 237, at 1273 (“Reimagined localism 
reflects excitement about cities as laboratories for policy experimentation.”). 
302 See supra Section I.G. 
303 Id. 
304 See, e.g., Adrianne Appel, Foam Takeout Containers Banned in Maine, BLOOMBERG 
L. (May 1, 2019, 5:41 AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/foam-takeout-containers-banned-in-maine [https://perma.cc/KNK2-SVCG];
Adrianne Appel, Maine, Vermont Join Plastic Bag-Ban Bandwagon, BLOOMBERG L. (June
17, 2019, 3:35 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XB00SNI0000000?bna_
news_filter=environment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016b6736db3fa5ef67b7
c3290000#jcite [https://perma.cc/F6E5-VC3Z]; Andrew M. Ballard, Maryland Foam
Packaging Ban, Energy Bills to Become Law, BLOOMBERG L. (May 24, 2019, 12:50 PM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XBH2OGM8000000?bna_news_filter=environ
ment-and-energy&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016ae514dfa3a7fbedbe90390002#jcite
[https://perma.cc/9YBC-YEQM].
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fee analysis. Some of these localities even expressly designate their 
targeted taxes as “surcharges” rather than “taxes.”305 And many fall 
within the locality’s “business license” regime. If the targeted taxes are 
more likely fees than taxes, there are several important implications. In 
some cases, localities may even want to consider structuring certain 
revenue-raising measures as fees instead of taxes. 
1. Tax or Fee?
Courts analyze multiple factors to determine if a government levy
constitutes a tax or a fee.306 A primary factor is whether the proceeds 
are used for general government support or to further the specific 
regulatory purposes of the law.307 Courts also analyze whether the 
payor receives some specific benefit beyond those received by non-
payors and whether the levy exceeds the government’s regulatory 
costs.308  
The California Constitution incorporates these principles in its 
definition of fees that are not subject to the local tax supermajority 
approval requirement, including: 
(1) A charge imposed for a specific benefit conferred or privilege
granted directly to the payor that is not provided to those not charged,
and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State of
conferring the benefit or granting the privilege to the payor.
(2) A charge imposed for a specific government service or product
provided directly to the payor that is not provided to those not
charged, and which does not exceed the reasonable costs to the State
of providing the service or product to the payor.
(3) A charge imposed for the reasonable regulatory costs to the State
incident to issuing licenses and permits, performing investigations,
inspections, and audits, enforcing agricultural marketing orders, and
the administrative enforcement and adjudication thereof.309
305 See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F) (2019). 
306 See HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 2.01[1]. 
307 See First Baptist Church of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul, 884 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2016); 
Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995); Heavens v. King Cty. Rural Library 
Dist., 404 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1965).  
308 First Baptist Church of St. Paul, 884 N.W.2d at 355; Covell, 906 P.2d at 324; 
Heavens, 404 P.2d at 453. 
309 CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e). California courts have also established factors to 
determine whether a levy is a tax or fee. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1997); Morning Star Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 135 Cal. Rptr. 457 
(2012). 
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The targeted tax provisions addressed above contain elements of 
both a tax and a fee. Many of the targeted taxes fall with the locality’s 
business license provisions. Thus, the targeted tax is arguably the 
charge for the privilege of doing business in the locality. Some 
provisions even use the term “surcharge” or “charge” instead of 
“tax.”310 The inherent structure of a per-employee business license 
levy lends toward a fee designation. The business receives the specific 
benefit of having each incremental employee generating revenue 
within the locality. Non-payors are not allowed to have employees, and 
thus do not obtain the specific benefit. Regarding the regulatory 
purpose, a locality could argue that each employee creates additional 
administrative and regulatory costs. Additionally, some assert that the 
large businesses upon which the charge is imposed contribute to 
homelessness by hiring high-wage employees, which escalates housing 
costs. Thus, the targeted tax provisions could arguably serve the 
purpose of regulating employment levels and housing costs within the 
locality.  
Most of the targeted taxes also have an explicit revenue designation. 
San Francisco’s homelessness tax, for example, expressly hypothecates 
the revenue to a specific fund that is dedicated to funding a 
homelessness mitigation program. Seattle’s homelessness tax proceeds 
were to be deposited into the city’s general fund, but the bill that created 
the tax included a companion resolution that adopted a specific 
spending plan for the resulting revenue.311  
The primary argument against fee characterization is that the 
amounts exceed the reasonable costs the locality incurs to provide the 
privilege, benefit, or regulatory environment. Challenges on these 
grounds are common and often result in the levy being characterized as 
a tax rather than a fee.312 However, the targeted tax provisions present 
unique considerations. The novel argument that the provision regulates 
employment levels and housing costs may justify the significant 
revenue the homelessness tax would generate. The locality creating 
affordable housing, which would cost millions annually, could 
arguably fall within this regulatory scope. Regarding per-employee 
310 See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., CITY CODE § 7.02.500(F) (2019). 
311 SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL, supra note 7; City Council Res. 31810, 2018 Leg. (Seattle, 
Wash. 2018). 
312 See, e.g., Mich. Ass’n of Home Builders v. City of Troy, No. 156737 (Mich. July 11, 
2019) (determining building inspection charges were a tax and not a fee because the revenue 
exceeded the actual costs to administer the inspection program, so the charges did not “bear 
a reasonable relation” to the costs of the government service provided). 
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business license charges, one could viably argue that even $500 per 
employee is a reasonable cost to regulate a business operating in the 
locality, particularly if the regulatory regime was defined broadly and 
skillfully. Depending on the context, either the locality or the business 
may find it advantageous to argue that the levy is a fee rather than a 
tax.  
2. Tax Versus Fee Implications
One of the most important implications of the tax versus fee
distinction relates to procedural constraints on local taxation, as 
discussed above.313 Specifically, several states—including California 
and Oregon—have a supermajority requirement for new or increased 
taxes, the precise wording of which may encompass or exclude fees.314 
Because targeted taxes are controversial and likely to be challenged, 
determining their proper character is crucial to establish their validity 
under specific supermajority requirement constraints—as San 
Francisco is tackling currently. California also has a constitutional 
provision that precludes voters from challenging tax levies and 
appropriations using the referendum process.315 The California 
Supreme Court is considering whether that provision applies to fees, 
such as a water fee instituted to fund infrastructure repair.316 Fee 
characterization may also circumvent constitutional uniformity 
clauses, discussed above.317 Uniformity requirements generally apply 
only to taxes, not fees.318 Many localities also face substantive 
constraints on local taxation, which can potentially be obviated with a 
fee rather than a tax. For example, if a locality such as New York City 
or Washington, D.C., is not permitted to impose an income tax on 
nonresidents, the locality may be able to accomplish similar revenue 
generation and distributional impact with a services “fee” instead. 
313 See supra Section II.D. 
314 Compare CAL. CONST. art. XIII C, § 1(e) (excluding fees expressly from the 
supermajority approval requirement), with FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (including fees 
expressly in the supermajority approval requirement). 
315 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. 
316 Paul Jones, California High Court to Vet Whether Fees Are Subject to Referendum, 
TAX NOTES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/local-
taxation/california-high-court-vet-whether-fees-are-subject-referendum/2019/02/14/294kr 
[https://perma.cc/68WS-B78K]; see also CAL. CONST. arts. II, § 9, XIII C, & XIII D, § 6 
(proposing Proposition 218). 
317 See supra Section II.C. 
318 HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 254, ¶ 2.01[1]. 
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Businesses may also want to characterize a levy as a fee rather than 
a tax, particularly if the business is challenging the provision. A key 
implication of the tax versus fee distinction is whether the federal Tax 
Injunction Act applies. If the levy is a tax, the Tax Injunction Act 
essentially precludes federal courts from adjudicating any challenges 
to the tax.319 If the levy is a fee, however, businesses may challenge it 
in a federal court, which many perceive as a fairer forum.320 Thus, if a 
locality enacts a targeted tax, it will likely be accompanied by the tax 
versus fee complication.  
III 
SUPERIOR ALTERNATIVES TO TARGETED TAXES 
Despite local revenue-raising constraints, there are several 
alternative approaches that will generate the requisite revenue—and 
may serve an expressive function—more effectively than targeted 
taxes. The optimal alternative is to foster a voluntary contribution 
program. Businesses can contribute to these programs to effectuate an 
agreed-upon objective, such as homelessness mitigation or 
transportation infrastructure improvement. If a voluntary contribution 
program is not feasible, the next best alternative is using one 
comprehensive local business tax regime—ideally an existing 
regime.321 And if a locality demands a targeted tax approach, perhaps 
because it desires stronger virtue signaling through its tax regime, the 
locality should target the most direct cause of the given problem.322 
A. Partnering to Foster Voluntary Contributions
A cooperative partnership between localities and large businesses, 
in which they work together to achieve a mutually beneficial result, is 
the optimal approach to effectively address the problems discussed 
above. Through voluntary contribution programs, the locality can 
generate the requisite revenue and both the locality and large 
businesses can express their commitment to solving the community’s 
most pressing challenges. Although taxes essentially allow only for 
319 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). 
320 See, e.g., Hellerstein & Appleby, supra note 286.  
321 For a detailed discussion of tax instrument choice generally, see David Gamage, How 
Should Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the 
Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1 (2014). 
322 Although a more direct targeted approach may be superior to the targeted tax 
approaches discussed above, even the most direct targeted taxes still present tax policy and 
constitutional concerns.  
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unilateral governmental virtue signaling, voluntary contribution 
programs allow for multilateral virtue signaling.  
To effectuate that virtue signaling and effectively incentivize 
participation, the most important aspect of a voluntary contribution 
program is for the locality to publicly laud large businesses’ 
contributions. Many of these large businesses already contribute 
significantly to the particular cause at issue, but the adversarial 
relationship between the locality and the large businesses obfuscates 
those contributions and disincentivizes additional contributions. If 
there is a clear and robust publicity campaign, these large businesses 
can easily justify multimillion-dollar contributions as productive public 
relations outlays. A highly publicized list of the amounts each business 
contributed also benefits localities by serving a soft shaming function 
that further incentivizes businesses to contribute.  
Voluntary contribution arrangements as alternatives to taxation have 
been successful in many cases. The most common arrangement is a 
payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) agreement, in which a locality and an 
entity agree upon an established payment amount in lieu of a specified 
tax imposition.323 PILOTs are most common with tax-exempt entities 
that receive benefits from a locality but do not pay taxes to fund those 
benefits, notably transportation infrastructure.324 The PILOT 
arrangement is thus a tax alternative that compensates the locality 
relative to the benefit it provides to the entity. Although PILOTs have 
been implemented most frequently in northeastern localities, and 
usually involve tax-exempt universities and hospitals, they are 
applicable broadly.325 Indeed, many jurisdictions have used PILOTs as 
an incentive to attract or retain for-profit businesses.326 With these 
323 See Daphne A. Kenyon & Adam H. Langley, Payments in Lieu of Taxes: Balancing 
Municipal and Nonprofit Interests, LINCOLN INST. LAND POL’Y (2010), https://www. 
lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/payments-in-lieu-of-taxes-full_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/75DG-6UV9]; Eric A. Lustig, A Continuing Look at Boston’s Revised Payment in 
Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) Program: Updated Version 2.0, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. ON REMAND 
1 (2015); Maria Di Miceli, Drive Your Own PILOT: Federal and State Constitutional 
Challenges to the Imposition of Payments in Lieu of Taxes on Tax-Exempt Entities, 66 TAX 
LAW. 835 (2013); Theodore C. Sorensen, Payments in Lieu of Taxes: A Development in 
American Law, 30 NEB. L. REV. 86 (1950). 
324 Between 2000 and 2010, at least 117 municipalities in at least eighteen states used 
PILOT arrangements. Kenyon & Langley, supra note 323, at 43. 
325 See id. at 7. 
326 See, e.g., Frederic Sautet & John Shoaf, Commentary, Local Tax Incentives in 
Action: The Payment-in-Lieu-of-Tax Program in Memphis, Tennessee, MERCATUS POL’Y 
SERIES (2006). 
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incentive arrangements, the locality agrees to accept less revenue than 
an existing tax regime would generate. But it is also possible, and 
preferable, for the locality to receive greater revenues from voluntary 
contributions than taxes. As discussed above, some localities assert that 
large businesses receive benefits that exceed their current tax 
payments. Many businesses do not dispute these assertions. PILOTs 
can be used to account for that additional benefit without complicated 
new tax regimes and serve a multilateral expressive function.327  
There are some concerns with PILOT agreements, however. In some 
cases, especially in the incentive context, the PILOT agreement may be 
concealed and the payment amounts may be arbitrary or 
nonuniform.328 In such a case, PILOTs may violate both horizontal and 
vertical equity.329 These concerns can be minimized through 
transparency, which serves several purposes. As discussed above, 
broad disclosure incentivizes participation and serves an expressive 
function.330 Transparency also mitigates equity concerns by providing 
all parties sufficient information to act accordingly within the realm of 
these voluntary programs. Businesses may have another significant 
concern with PILOTS, particularly in the context of the homelessness 
epidemic. With PILOTs, the locality generally controls how the 
revenues are directed. If there is fundamental disagreement as to how 
to remedy a problem—for example, spending on shelters versus 
affordable housing to combat homelessness—PILOTs will be more 
difficult to effectuate. However, there are methods to alleviate this 
tension, as discussed below. And this fundamental disagreement is not 
as strong in many cases, such as with transportation infrastructure 
development.  
If a large business is unwilling to relinquish spending control, an 
alternative is a services in lieu of taxes (SILOT) arrangement.331 
SILOTs generally shift the decision-making function from the locality 
327 Localities can also tie zoning approvals to contribution agreements, which may 
incentivize businesses further. However, localities must proceed delicately to avoid 
perceptions of extortion that can undermine the cooperative relationship.  
328 See Julia A. Quigley, Payments in Lieu of Trouble: Nonprofit Pilots as Extortion or 
Efficient Public Finance?, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 272, 273 (2018); Kenyon & Langley, 
supra note 323, at 32. 
329 A PILOT could violate vertical equity if a smaller, less successful business pays a 
greater amount than a larger, more successful business. A PILOT could violate horizontal 
equity if similarly situated businesses pay different amounts. Both scenarios are quite 
common with incentive PILOTs. 
330 See, e.g., Lustig, supra note 323, at 11 (stating that a “very strong public push for 
increased participation” was effective at increasing PILOT contributions in Boston). 
331 See Kenyon & Langley, supra note 323, at 41. 
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to the businesses. For example, a large business could agree to build 
and operate homeless shelters within the locality in exchange for the 
locality not imposing any new or increased targeted taxes. Localities 
are likely to resist SILOTs, particularly with for-profit entities. Shifting 
the decision-making function away from the locality jeopardizes a 
cohesive strategy and certain collective benefits, such as economies of 
scale. For example, a business may spend in just one particular 
neighborhood, or may spend in ways that do not reflect the priorities of 
the locality as a whole. And SILOTs may not be feasible to address 
certain issues, such as constructing transportation infrastructure.  
Both PILOT and SILOT arrangements require a detailed agreement 
between the locality and the business. There are several aspects of the 
agreement that can increase the likelihood of success. The agreement 
should incorporate a multiyear term, which provides the business with 
payment certainty and the locality with revenue stability. The 
agreement should contain some degree of spending direction, which 
can range from very general to very specific, depending on the 
circumstances. The spending direction is less likely to be of concern 
with transportation infrastructure development than with homelessness 
mitigation. The most complicated aspect is the payment amount. In 
some cases, a flat amount based on anticipated costs for certain projects 
may suffice.332 In other cases, particularly with multiple diverse 
businesses participating, the program can use an easily verified proxy 
to estimate each business’s benefit received or ability to pay.333  
Importantly, businesses should be able to deduct the PILOT and 
SILOT payments for federal tax purposes. These payments should 
constitute ordinary and necessary business expenses under Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) section 162.334 Alternatively, they may constitute 
deductible state and local taxes under IRC section 164.335  
332 For example, if a city (such as Mountain View or Cupertino) with one primary 
employer determined that it needed $50 million over five years to adequately expand its 
transportation infrastructure, the primary employer may agree to fund that amount in lieu of 
new or increased targeted taxes.  
333 If a locality has an existing gross receipts tax, the business’s gross receipts may be a 
practical proxy. If a locality uses employees as a proxy, it should use the employee count as 
of a static past date to minimize hiring distortion. If the basis of the payment is ability to 
pay, financial accounting net profit may be an appealing proxy. 
334 I.R.C. §§ 162, 164 (2018); Rev. Proc. 2019-12. 
335 I.R.C. § 164; Treas. Reg. § 1.164-4 (2019); Rev. Rul. 71-49, 1971-1 C.B. 103; Rev. 
Rul. 61-152, 1961-2 C.B. 42; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200926023, 2009 WL 1817277 (June 26, 
2009); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201516007, 2015 WL 1743638 (Apr. 17, 2015); Rev. Proc. 
2019-12. The standard for deductibility of payments in lieu of taxes under I.R.C. § 164 is 
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Charitable contributions to specified charities are another option, 
although this option has several disadvantages compared to PILOTs 
and SILOTs. With charitable contributions, both the locality and the 
large businesses relinquish direct decision-making control. The locality 
can maintain a list of approved charities to which businesses may 
contribute and can provide oversight. Businesses can avoid a certain 
charity if it is not adequately directing the contributed funds. But these 
indirect tools reduce efficiency, as do added layers of bureaucracy and 
administrative costs. This option also presents limitations on federal 
income tax deductions. The payments would likely fall within 
charitable contribution deduction limitations under IRC section 170, 
which would affect businesses with low or no federal taxable 
income.336 But businesses may prefer the charitable contributions 
regardless of tax deductions, the value of which has decreased 
significantly due to the reduced corporate income tax rate, because 
nongovernmental entities may be more agile and flexible than 
governments.337  
A related option is for a locality to provide local-level tax credits for 
charitable contributions. The Seattle City Council considered a tax 
credit for charitable contributions to nonprofit organizations that 
provide services to those experiencing homelessness, although the tax 
credit mechanism did not make it into the enacted homelessness tax 
bill.338 And, at least temporarily, San Francisco is providing a tax credit 
for contributions made to its homelessness mitigation fund.339 The 
fundamental flaw with the tax credit approach is that to generate 
additional revenue the locality still needs to create or increase a tax on 
businesses. There are no real benefits to such an approach beyond those 
whether the payment is “an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative authority 
in the exercise of the taxing power, and imposed and collected for the purpose of raising 
revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes.” Rev. Rul. 71-49, 1971-1 C.B. 103. 
However, if the corporate contribution “serves a business purpose,” it will be deductible 
under I.R.C. § 162 to the extent disallowed under I.R.C. § 164. Rev. Proc. 2019-12. This 
distinction is likely immaterial for the large businesses discussed in this Article. See also Di 
Miceli, supra note 323 (analyzing whether traditional PILOTs are better characterized as a 
tax or fee for tax purposes). 
336 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2). If a business has no federal taxable income, additional deductions 
do not provide any current-year tax benefit. The deductions may provide future-year 
benefits, however.  
337 See I.R.C. § 11. Cisco Systems, Inc. recently committed $50 million over five years 
to a Silicon Valley homelessness mitigation nonprofit organization because of these 
perceived benefits. Rogers, supra note 68.  
338 Dan Eder Memorandum, supra note 6. 
339 See supra Section I.B.1. 
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of a PILOT or SILOT arrangement, and almost all the tax policy and 
practical drawbacks of targeted taxes would remain or be exacerbated. 
Thus, PILOT or SILOT arrangements are the preferred mechanism to 
effectuate local voluntary contribution programs.  
Avoiding an adversarial relationship between a locality and its 
largest employer is beneficial for many reasons. A cooperative 
partnership is likely to maximize additional revenue and serve a strong, 
positive expressive function. From a practical perspective, both 
localities and businesses will conserve considerable resources that they 
would otherwise expend through administration, compliance, and 
challenges related to new targeted taxes. Voluntary contribution 
programs must be implemented thoughtfully and in the genuine spirit 
of cooperation. If implemented properly, voluntary contribution 
programs are the most effective and efficient solution in the current 
environment. 
B. One Comprehensive Local Business Tax
If a voluntary contribution program is not a viable alternative, the 
locality’s business tax regime should minimize practical and tax policy 
disadvantages. The next best alternative is to increase the rate of an 
existing, less controversial tax base, without an accompanying 
specified spending directive.340 Avoiding explicit revenue 
hypothecation will reduce opportunities for ideological disagreement 
and minimize supermajority approval hurdles.341 
Determining that existing, less controversial tax base will vary 
by locality, depending on the locality’s historical experience and 
applicable revenue-raising constraints.342 Some West Coast cities, 
notably Seattle and San Francisco, have an existing comprehensive 
gross receipts tax regime. Gross receipts taxes have benefits and 
drawbacks.343 Many localities prefer gross receipts taxes because they 
are easier to administer than net income taxes, and localities tend to 
have limited audit and administrative resources. Gross receipts taxes 
also reduce manipulation and instability concerns that mire corporate 
340 Cf. Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Local Political Economy Through Modernizing the 
Property Tax, 68 TAX L. REV. 143, 144 (2014) (“But why create new taxes when an old and 
proven tax is available?”). 
341 This approach does, however, reduce the tax law’s expressive effect. 
342 Broad-based tax regimes are preferred over “narrow-based” taxes for many reasons. 
See, e.g., Gamage, supra note 246, at 751–52. 
343 See Bird, supra note 224. 
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net income taxes.344 Gross receipts taxes reduce business migration 
concerns, particularly compared with direct per-employee taxes.345  
However, gross receipts taxes are an imprecise measure of ability 
to pay.346 Using gross receipts as a proxy for ability to pay 
disproportionately affects businesses with greater transactional 
turnover, particularly those in low profit margin industries. Many gross 
receipts tax regimes implement different tax rates for different 
industries, but this approach complicates the regime significantly, 
creates areas for dispute, and is still an imprecise mechanism to 
determine ability to pay.347 Gross receipts taxes, particularly retail-
focused taxes like Portland’s, are also easier for businesses to pass 
through to customers due to their inherent transactional nature.348 
Businesses are less likely to pass through broad-based gross receipts 
taxes to consumers directly, but businesses may still effectuate an 
indirect pass-through of the additional tax costs by increasing prices, 
either universally or for customers located in the respective locality. 
Despite these concerns, gross receipts taxes may be the only practical 
business tax option for many localities. 
Business taxpayers are generally less resistant to slightly increased 
existing taxes than an entirely new tax regime—or several. Experience 
has demonstrated that large businesses value certainty and consistency 
far more than actual cash tax liability. By using an existing tax regime, 
344 See generally Gamage, supra note 246 (discussing subnational government fiscal 
volatility). 
345 With the rise of economic presence nexus, businesses cannot escape a locality’s 
jurisdiction to tax by migrating its physical presence outside the locality. The primary 
migration concern with gross receipts taxes is a seller withdrawing from the particular 
market. This response is possible but much less realistic, particularly as applied to large 
localities. See supra Section II.A.2. The more likely response is the business passing the 
gross receipts tax costs to buyers. See supra Section II.A.2. 
346 If a locality does not have an existing gross receipts tax regime, a “real corporate 
profits tax” based on financial accounting rather than tax accounting is an interesting option. 
See, e.g., Richard Rubin, Elizabeth Warren Proposes New Corporate Tax, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 11, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elizabeth-warren-proposes-new-
corporate-tax-11554987601 [https://perma.cc/UCJ7-MGMC]. However, there are many 
concerns with this novel approach that would be exacerbated at the local level. Others have 
suggested a “Business Value Tax,” which has many appealing features but may be too novel 
for U.S. localities. See Bird, supra note 224. 
347 The common gross receipt tax structure would likely violate uniformity provisions if 
a state has a constitutional provision that applies broadly to all tax types (e.g., Oregon). See 
supra Section II.C; see also Scharff, supra note 248, at 332 (“[If localities each impose] 
different tax rates on different types of business activity . . . the opportunities for tax 
planning, record keeping, and compliance costs for businesses engaged in multiple business 
lines across multiple jurisdictions, and enforcement costs within each jurisdiction, all rise.”). 
348 See supra Section II.A.2. 
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the locality avoids additional administrative costs, and taxpayers avoid 
additional compliance costs. Both parties avoid significant costs 
associated with challenges to the tax regime’s validity and application. 
Localities must still be cognizant, however, of the tax rate and 
understand the elasticity of the tax, or the new tax may suffer from the 
drawbacks discussed above.349  
The preferred tax alternative for most localities is solely a broad-
based gross receipts tax regime. Cities such as San Francisco and 
Seattle that already have this type of regime can increase rates to 
generate additional revenue, at least to a degree. These localities will 
avoid costly and lengthy legal challenges to the validity and application 
of a new tax. If a tax regime has different tax rates depending on 
industry classification, any rate increases should be proportionally 
uniform across all classifications to avoid discrimination and practical 
challenges. Notably, localities should avoid increasing the tax rate only 
for the tech industry, which could lead to migration and other negative 
outcomes discussed above.350  
Broad-based gross receipts taxes are suitable for many localities that 
are considering their initial business tax regime as well. These localities 
can use other localities’ existing gross receipts tax regimes as a 
blueprint, which is more efficient and promotes uniformity. For cities 
like Cupertino, there is also a clearer nexus between broad-based gross 
receipts taxes and transportation infrastructure than with homelessness 
mitigation. A locality generating tax revenue for its general fund that it 
will spend to develop and maintain transportation infrastructure should 
not be overly controversial. It is well accepted that transportation 
infrastructure development is a primary governmental function; one 
that provides the necessary physical setting for a business to operate 
and grow—which the business should fund. Although voluntary 
contribution programs may be more effective and may provide a more 
349 See, e.g., Gamage, supra note 246, at 791 (“The degree to which taxpayers are likely 
to relocate across state lines or play timing games across tax years in response to tax hikes 
is an important factor in determining the desirability of tax-rate adjustments . . . .”); see also 
Preemption and Fiscal Authority, supra note 237, at 1277–78 (“[H]orizontal and vertical 
tax competition imposes practical limits on a local government’s ability to raise tax revenue 
by increasing tax rates.”); Scharff, supra note 248, at 321–26 (providing a detailed 
discussion of horizontal and vertical tax competition); Bird, supra note 224, at 708 (“[Gross 
receipts tax regimes] should not be pressed too far in terms of rates—because economic 
distortions rise with the square of the tax rate—[but they] may be acceptable at relatively 
low rates.”). 
350 See supra Section II.A. 
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robust expressive function, a broad-based gross receipts tax minimizes 
the tax policy and practical disadvantages inherent with targeted taxes. 
C. Improving Target Accuracy
If a locality is unwavering on a targeted approach, the locality should 
target the most direct cause of the problem it is attempting to remedy.  
1. Usage Charges to Fund Transportation Infrastructure
There are several alternatives to fund transportation infrastructure
that may better align the beneficiary with the associated cost.351 At the 
outset, it is important to recognize that a locality’s transportation 
infrastructure is a cohesive system of interdependent and 
complementary transportation modes. Potential funding solutions must 
consider the locality’s transportation infrastructure holistically, and 
how altering costs of a particular transportation mode will affect other 
modes.  
One of the most promising local funding options is a congestion 
pricing regime.352 European cities have implemented congestion 
pricing regimes with great success.353 New York City is the first U.S. 
locality to adopt congestion pricing, as discussed above.354 At least 
initially, the regime is anticipated to generate $1 billion annually that 
will be used to fund the city’s transit system.355 New York City has not 
yet determined pricing, which is a crucial aspect to a congestion pricing 
regime’s effectiveness. Appropriate pricing depends on a locality’s 
primary aim. If a locality’s primary aim is to reduce or eliminate 
vehicles, and thus congestion, it should implement substantial charges 
to enter the city. The long-term effect, however, is that the regime will 
351 See generally ROBERT KROL, MERCATUS CTR. AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., TOLLING 
THE FREEWAY: CONGESTION PRICING AND THE ECONOMICS OF MANAGING TRAFFIC 
(2016).  
352 See id. This Article does not address “vehicle miles traveled” taxes because they are 
not a feasible alternative at the local level. However, these taxes may be the only viable 
option to fund transportation infrastructure maintenance and development at the federal 
level and could be remarkably effective if they implemented a dynamic congestion feature. 
353 Id. at 16–19. 
354 See supra Section I.E. At the state level in the United States, high-occupancy tolling 
(HOT) has been implemented on various highways, which has reduced congestion and 
produced general net welfare gains. Sentiment has been very positive, largely because there 
is a free option, unlike with full congestion pricing. See KROL, supra note 351, at 20–22; 
see generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social 
Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231 (2000). 
355 S. 1509, S. Assemb. (N.Y. 2019) (enacted Apr. 12, 2019); Clark, supra note 172. 
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generate nominal revenue as behavior shifts away from driving into the 
city. Compounding that effect, many of those individuals will shift to 
public transportation, which will necessitate additional funding to 
expand and operate.356 If a locality’s primary aim is to generate 
additional revenue and minimize behavior distortion, it should 
determine the charges very carefully, considering elasticity and 
dynamic pricing options.  
If implemented properly, congestion pricing can generate significant 
revenue to fund transportation infrastructure.357 That revenue will be 
generated directly by those who use the local roadways; that is, those 
who obtain the associated benefits and create the associated negative 
externalities.358 Congestion pricing is more politically palatable 
because most of the individuals who will bear the costs reside—and 
vote—outside the locality. And those who can afford to drive into 
major cities regularly likely have sufficient ability to pay. There are 
certainly administrative costs associated with new congestion pricing 
regimes, however. The individuals affected by the congestion pricing 
regime are likely to pursue legal challenges.359 Enforcement also 
requires various physical infrastructure and logistical measures.360 
Major U.S. cities will be observing New York City’s experience, which 
could spur a rapid proliferation of congestion pricing regimes.361 
356 One side effect of reducing vehicles in a city is reducing parking revenue. Many 
parking facilities are publicly owned and operated, which could further reduce local 
government revenue, at least until the facilities are repurposed for a potentially more 
lucrative or socially beneficial use—possibly even affordable housing or homeless shelters. 
See generally Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 50–54), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3345366 [https:// 
perma.cc/Z7QP-F2U9] (discussing “The Planned Economy of Parking”). 
357 See generally Bird, supra note 224, at 706 n.19 (asserting that “user charges . . . are 
almost always the most desirable possible way for local governments to raise revenue, 
whenever feasible . . . .”). 
358 See generally KROL, supra note 351; Strahilevitz, supra note 354. 
359 It would not be surprising to see New Jersey residents, or even state or local 
governments, challenging New York City’s congestion pricing regime on discrimination or 
other constitutional grounds. Generally, congestion pricing regimes are unpopular, although 
that popularity shifts after implementation when the public experiences the benefit of less 
congestion. KROL, supra note 351, at 24. 
360 Strahilevitz, supra note 354, at 1248–49. New York City has a logistical advantage 
over many other cities because Manhattan is an island with limited access points, most of 
which already have automated toll systems.  
361 Another interesting option for New York City is tax-increment financing, where the 
city would charge additional property tax based on the additional value generated by a 
property’s proximity to public transportation. See, e.g., NYC Subway, supra note 167. There 
are various issues with tax-increment financing generally, and this approach is likely 
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If a government’s goal is to reduce transportation infrastructure 
usage generally, implementing a tax credit for remote workers is an 
interesting option.362 Massachusetts is considering this type of 
program, in which it would offer tax credits to businesses based on how 
many of their Massachusetts-resident employees work remotely 
instead of commuting.363 This type of program is more practical at the 
state level, but it may also be possible at the local level. The desired 
result for a locality would be the locally headquartered businesses 
generating the same taxable gross receipts, but without the influx of 
employees that overwhelm transportation infrastructure and escalate 
housing costs. There are several potential concerns, however. A 
distributed remote workforce makes business migration easier, allows 
for smaller offices that would reduce property tax revenues, and may 
have a negative overall impact on the local economy. This type of tax 
credit program is still in its infancy but may be a viable complement to 
a comprehensive gross receipts tax regime, as discussed above.364 
2. “Mansion” and “Vacant Home” Taxes to Combat Homelessness
If the root cause of the targeted problem is an influx of wealthy tech
employees driving up housing costs, as is often asserted with West 
Coast homelessness, a direct tax on purchasing expensive housing is 
the most effective solution. As discussed above, real property transfer 
taxes on expensive housing, colloquially termed “mansion” taxes, are 
both quite common and controversial.  
The primary virtue of mansion taxes is that they can account for the 
negative externalities that are associated with escalating housing costs. 
They also exert downward pressure on sales prices, at least for 
expensive housing.365 If a mansion tax is triggered at a certain sales 
price, especially if the tax is imposed on the entire sales price, there is 
a strong incentive to keep the sales price below that threshold.366 
practical in only a handful of U.S. cities to fund public transit. See also Shanske, supra note 
340, at 162–65, 170 (discussing “special assessments” for property tax purposes); see 
generally Scharff, supra note 248.  
362 H. DOCKET NO. 4396, H. NO. 4002 (Mass. July 25, 2019) (proposed by Charles D. 
Baker). 
363 Id. 
364 See infra Section III.B. 
365 The downward pressure on expensive housing may flow downstream to less 
expensive housing. 
366 See Wojciech Kopczuk & David J. Munroe, Mansion Tax: The Effect of Transfer 
Taxes on the Residential Real Estate Market, 7 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y. 214 (2015) 
(finding that mansion taxes in New York and New Jersey incentivized buyers and sellers 
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Both buyers and sellers have an incentive to devise creative 
arrangements to keep the sales price below that threshold.367 This 
“notch” effect can be lessened by using a progressive multistep 
schedule, but at the expense of simplicity.368 Many localities also favor 
mansion taxes because they seemingly target individuals with 
sufficient ability to pay. In many high-cost cities, however, mansion 
taxes can apply to modest working-class housing.369 Choosing the 
optimal threshold is incredibly important with mansion taxes. 
Real estate transfer taxes have significant revenue-raising 
potential.370 For example, San Jose analyzed a potential universal real 
estate transfer tax increase from 0.33% to 0.499% of assessed value.371 
The tax rate increase would generate an estimated $54 million in annual 
revenue and add approximately $2,000 to the $1.125 million average 
sales price in San Jose.372 Likely because real estate transfer taxes are 
insignificant compared to the overall sales price and other transaction 
costs, they do not appear to affect the frequency and amount of real 
estate transactions.373 However, the primary concern with real estate 
to transact below the $1 million cutoff); Oshrat Carmiel, Manhattan Home Sales Get 
Short-Term Lift on Mansion Tax Increase, BLOOMBERG L. (July 2, 2019, 2:53 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/document/X121V708000000?bna_news_filte
r=daily-tax-report&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016bb213d252a96ffebb3ee50000#jcite 
[https://perma.cc/WKB5-YP3J].  
367 See Roxanne Bland, Soak the Rich! Part 2: The Mansion Tax, TAX NOTES (Aug. 5, 
2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/property-taxation/soak-rich-part-2-
mansion-tax/2019/08/05/29rb4?highlight=soak%20the%20rich [https://perma.cc/A383-
NPCG]. 
368 Taxpayers have challenged tax regimes that impose a “notch” effect on equal 
protection clause grounds, but they have generally not been successful. Trump v. Chu, 478 
N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915 (1985); Magoun v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. 
Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898); Miller v. Heffernan, 378 A.2d 572, 578 (1977). However, 
“notch” effect challenges may be more successful if a state constitution’s uniformity clause 
applies to the tax at issue. See, e.g., Pharr Road Inv. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 162 S.E.2d 333 
(1968).  
369 The average sales price of a residence in New York City or San Jose is around 
$1 million. See THE ELLIMAN REPORT, supra note 175; San Francisco Bay Area, supra note 
165. 
370 See generally URBAN INSTITUTE, JUNG CHOI ET AL., EXPLORING THE VIABILITY OF 
MANSION TAX APPROACHES (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/ 
98423/exploring_the_viability_of_mansion_tax_approaches_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8WN2-FTA9]. 
371 San Francisco Bay Area, supra note 165. 
372 Id. 
373 See Joel Slemrod et al., The Behavioral Response to Housing Transfer Taxes: 
Evidence from a Notched Change in D.C. Policy, 100 J. URB. ECON. 137 (2017) (finding 
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transfer taxes generally is that they lack stability; the tax revenue is 
subject to market conditions. If a real estate market crash occurs, like 
in 2008, revenues can fall precipitously when they are needed most.  
There are several other real property tax alternatives, including 
existing property tax increases and “vacant home,” or “pied-à-terre,” 
taxes.374 General property taxes can generate significant revenue and 
can be more stable than real estate transfer taxes.375 However, many 
state constitutions require uniform property taxes, which prevents a 
targeted approach and results in a regressive tax. A regressive housing 
tax is particularly counterproductive in the homelessness context. If 
increased housing costs are a significant cause of homelessness, 
increasing housing costs with a uniform property tax does not make 
sense. 
With those concerns in mind, several localities have shifted their 
focus to property taxes targeted at “vacant” homes.376 Certain cities 
have experienced significant property investment from wealthy buyers, 
many of whom are foreign.377 These individuals purchase expensive 
properties either as vacation homes or purely as passive investments.378 
Localities assert that these purchases escalate housing costs, 
particularly in geographically constrained areas such as Manhattan, 
San Francisco, and Hawaii.379 One study concluded that San Francisco 
had 100,000 vacant housing units, although there are many reasons 
why a house may be vacant, some of which are innocuous.380  
that real estate transfer taxes in Washington, D.C., pushed certain sales prices below the 
application notch, but did not significantly impact the frequency or amount of transactions). 
374 Gopal & Goldman, supra note 170; Billy Hamilton, Taxing ‘Ghost Homes,’ 
TAX NOTES (July 2, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/tax-policy/ 
taxing-ghost-homes/2019/07/02/29l5z?highlight=%22taxing%20ghost%20homes%22 
[https://perma.cc/3UDL-GAE6]; David McAfee, U.S. Cities Look to Vancouver’s Novel 
Empty Homes Tax, BLOOMBERG L. (July 24, 2019, 1:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg 
law.com/product/tax/document/XFNS3Q90000000?bna_news_filter=daily-tax-report-
state&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016c0aead2bfad6d9bef2c7b0001#jcite [https://perma.cc/ 
2YGR-BS4E].  
375 See Shanske, supra note 340, at 145. Seattle analyzed the alternative of a general 
property tax increase to generate the requisite revenue to mitigate its homelessness 
epidemic. If Seattle used a property tax levy, it would increase property taxes by an average 
of $150–$350 annually. Mosqueda Memorandum, supra note 17, at 2. 
376 Gopal & Goldman, supra note 170; Hamilton, supra note 374; McAfee, supra note 
374.  
377 Hamilton, supra note 374. 
378 Id. 
379 Id. 
380 McAfee, supra note 374.  
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Fundamentally, it is easy to understand why a locality would attempt 
to tax vacant houses when tens of thousands are experiencing 
homelessness. Imposing an additional property tax on vacant homes 
will have one of two primary effects, both of which are desirable for 
these localities. The homeowner may rent or sell the house, thereby 
increasing housing stock and possibly lowering rents universally. Or 
the homeowner may simply pay the tax, which will generate revenue 
the locality can use to combat homelessness. The locality’s tax rate will 
determine the degree to which homeowners choose between those 
options.381  
Vacant home taxes are similar to mansion taxes in that they have an 
application threshold based on the home’s value and impose a 
percentage tax based on that value. However, vacant home taxes are 
imposed annually, not just when a property is sold, so they have 
frequency and stability advantages over mansion taxes. Vacant home 
taxes also tend to generate less political opposition because most of the 
affected property owners are nonresidents who do not vote locally.  
Vancouver, British Columbia, enacted a vacant home property tax 
beginning in 2017.382 Vancouver imposes an additional annual 1% tax 
on the assessed value of a vacant home if that assessed value exceeds 
$1 million.383 In its first year, Vancouver’s vacant home tax generated 
$29 million, although it appears most of the tax was generated by 
average-priced houses and that vacancy rates were largely 
unchanged.384 Honolulu is considering a similar tax, which it estimates 
would generate $60 million annually.385 San Diego has commissioned 
a study analyzing real estate vacancy and potential tax options.386 Both 
New York City and San Francisco have considered vacant home tax 
proposals, but they have been met with overwhelming opposition from 
the real estate industry.387 It seems most U.S. localities are observing 
Vancouver’s experience to determine if the benefit of a vacant home 
tax outweighs its drawbacks. 
The drawbacks associated with a vacant home tax are considerable. 
Wealthy buyers may shift their behavior, either choosing to purchase 
381 See Hamilton, supra note 374. 
382 Id.; McAfee, supra note 374. 
383 McAfee, supra note 374. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. 
387 Id.; Gopal & Goldman, supra note 170; Hamilton, supra note 374. 
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homes in other cities or staying in hotels when visiting the particular 
city, which may have a negative broader economic effect.388 There will 
be legitimate discrimination claims and uniformity concerns, which 
will be costly for localities to defend.389 But the greatest practical 
hurdle is that vacant home taxes present myriad enforcement 
difficulties.390 The locality needs to determine the property’s value, 
which is the subject of considerable dispute with existing property 
taxes.391 The locality needs to clearly and precisely establish what 
constitutes a vacant property and when that determination is made. If a 
locality sets a bright-line threshold of usage or rental days per year, 
property owners may shift their behavior to satisfy those requirements. 
More nefariously, property owners may create artificial lease 
agreements, such as leasing to a family member with no actual 
payments or occupancy. If a property is considered vacant when it is 
not the individual’s principal residence, the tax may apply even if the 
individual lives in the property for half the year and rents it for the other 
half.392 An exemption for constructing or renovating the property is 
likely necessary, but it will create enforcement controversy.393 If the 
vacancy status is determined on a set day each year, as are some local 
property tax exemptions, property owners could avoid the tax very 
easily. Overall, mansion and vacant home taxes are better alternatives 
than targeted business taxes for mitigating homelessness, but they are 
still a suboptimal alternative. 
CONCLUSION 
Many localities are confronting unprecedented challenges, such as a 
dramatic rise in homelessness and insufficient transportation 
infrastructure. To cope with these challenges, localities must first 
establish clear objectives, and then proceed accordingly. Specifically, 
localities must decide whether to focus on generating additional local 
388 Gopal & Goldman, supra note 170. These considerations are compounded in cities 
that impose additional applicable taxes, such as “mansion” taxes or “foreign buyer” taxes. 
See, e.g., id.; Hamilton, supra note 374. 
389 See supra Section II.C. 
390 Oakland, California, enacted a tax on vacant lots, which avoids some of these 
enforcement concerns as it is easy to ascertain if there is a structure on the lot. See McAfee, 
supra note 374. 
391 See generally Shanske, supra note 340, at 148. 
392 The principal residence determination is itself a source of considerable controversy 
at the U.S. federal tax level. See, e.g., Guinan v. United States, No. CV 02-0261-PHX-PGR, 
2003 WL 21224797 (D. Ariz. Apr. 10, 2003).  
393 See, e.g., McAfee, supra note 374. 
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revenue in the near term or virtue signaling that could create a national 
sea change in the long term but fail to solve their current impending 
crises. If a locality chooses the former, several alternatives will 
generate the requisite revenue—and may serve an expressive 
function—more effectively than will targeted taxes.  
546 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 477 
